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ABSTRACT
This study determines which of the two critical variables-vessel or
personnel availability-will have the greater impact on strategic sealift given the
post-Cold War geo-political and fiscal environment, and examines the key
implications of a depressed U. S.-flag Merchant Marine (and maritime industry)
on contingency planning. In addition to reviewing the evolution and
development of the U. S. Merchant Marine and considering the repercussions of
past legislation on the current state of the industry, a synopsis of recently-
proposed maritime reforms and government-administered sealift programs is
provided. Further, shipbuilding and maritime labor trends are discussed. Using
Operations Desert Shield/Storm as a conceptual model for future scalift scenarios,
this analysis concludes that mariner availability, not ship availability, will be the
sealift "Achilles' heel" in a nearly simultaneous two MRC scenario. This study
includes the views of maritime industry representatives and government officials
as primary source data, and offers recommendations on potential sealift manning
Accesion For
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Often described as America's "fourth arm of defense,' the U. S. Merchant
Marine is poised on the verge of extinction. The precipitous decline in the size
of the U. S.-flag merchant fleet and the concomitant decrease in the supply of
maritime labor vis a vis other maritime nations must not be viewed exclusively
as an economic concern devoid of military significance. Indeed, the lack of
American-flag sealift-and the dearth of mariners needed to crew government-
and commercially-operated vessels during national emergencies-are not issues
which can be dismissed lightly under the rubric of maritime "survival of the
fittest." Rather, the foremost lesson to be relearned is that there is no long-term
substitute for a dependable, U. S.-flag merchant fleet-in-being. Only through
adequate sealift can the United States maintain the military capability to respond
quickly and decisively to regional crises, while simultaneously executing a global
strategy based on credible, sustained forward presence.
As demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the
absence of a healthy and robust U. S. Merchant Marine will impact adversely on
the ability of the Department of Defense to move equipment and supplies quickly
and efficiently to distant theaters in support of national--and coalition-interests
and objectives. Despite important similarities with previous mobilizations, one
is warned against making the Persian Gulf War the conceptual or policy model
for future sealift mobilizations in this post-Cold War environment. Although
xii
aspects of the Persian Gulf sealift response dovetail nicely with the Vietnam
sealift effort, and are instructive as planning tools for the next regional con-
tingency, placing too much emphasis on either the conduct or the characteristics
of this conflict does as much to distort and misrepresent the state of the U. S.
Merchant Marine as to ignore the geo-political and military dynamics in August,
1990.
Despite the immense volume of military cargo transported to Southwest
Asia, the sealift experience was, at best, a qualified success. Although the United
States was gi"-_" "carte blanche" to effect a two-phase sealift campaign over a
seven month period unencumbered by battle damage to vital port facilities and
with no attrition of shipping, American-flag surge sealift was inadequate to satisfy
logistics requirements. Nonetheless, there was sufficient sealift--American-flag
and otherwise-in this case to carry millions of tons of prepositioned, surge, and
sustainment equipment, fuel, and supplies to Southwest Asia. In fact, a conscious
decision was made by civilian and military leaders not to include certain DoD-
sponsored sealift programs in the call-up in order to preserve U. S.-flag interests
in the international shipping market.
Unlike the formal readiness conditions and activation timetables associated
with ships, there is no similar guidance for ensuring that an adequate number of
mariners will be available to crew strategic sealift vessels in a national emergency.
In fact, pre-Persian Gulf War manpower estimates predicted that some 9,000
seamen would be readily available to man the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). In
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reality, extraordinary measures were implemented just to obtain the 2,700
mariners needed to crew eighty percent of the Force. In short, the no-notice
activation of the Ready Reserve Force exhausted the available supply of maritime
labor-arguably under the best of politico-military circumstances.
Maritime employment projections, coupled with recent funding for vessel
acquisition and conversion, only reinforce the hypothesis that mariner availability
will emerge as the sine qua non of sealift in the twenty-first century. Not only will
the shortages of highly-skilled mariners continue in response to the decline of the
U. S.-flag Merchant Marine, but the manpower pool will be insufficient to crew
the projected 142-ship Ready Reserve Force and inadequate to meet the demands
imposed by a "nearly simultaneous" two Major Regional Contingency scenario.
Further, whether or not foreign-flag shipping is available to carry military cargo
is irrelevant to the near-term manning problem. That an abundance of foreign
shipping could be available does nothing to alleviate the underlying causes of the
manpower shortfalls or address the fact that Ready Reserve Force vessels still
must be crewed in a timely fashion. Until the configuration of the Ready Reserve
Force (and other sealift assets) is changed to reflect the handling and propulsion
systems found in modem merchant fleets, measures must be implemented to
maintain a cadre of active mariners possessing the requisite deck and engineering-
related skills to crew those older ships. This thesis includes recommendations on




Often described as America's "fourth arm of defense," the United States
Merchant Marine serves a dual function: during peacetime, commercial ships are
needed to facilitate the import and export of products and raw materials which
are vital to our economy and national security; during times of war and national
crises or emergencies, approximately ninety-five percent of all cargo, equipment,
and supplies is moved by merchant vessels to the theaters of operations. To be
sure, the merchant marine has played a pivotal role in the economic development
and military success of the U. S. throughout our history. Notwithstanding the
provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and despite the recent successes
of the U. S. Merchant Marine during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
the American maritime industry is poised on the verge of extinction.
Traditionally, those governmental agencies and military organizations
charged with overseeing sealift mobilization and readiness programs such as the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the
U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), have directed their main efforts
toward the acquisition, charter, and maintenance of militarily-useful merchant
ships for contingency operations. Many argue, however, that the most
troublesome issue facing the maritime industry, MARAD, and the Department of
1
Defense (DoD) is the shortage of highly-trained mariners-capable of deploying
rapidly on short- or no-notice during crises and operating for extended periods.
B. INTEREST AND PURPOSE
As a Naval Officer, a licensed Third Officer in the U. S. Merchant Marine,
and a student of strategic planning, the author believes that few leaders
understand or appreciate the unique and immediate problems facing the U. S.
Merchant Marine, and hence, the vulnerabilities of the strategic sealift concept
outlined in the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper "... From The Sea." The
typical Naval officer knows relatively little about either the U. S. maritime
industry or strategic sealift concepts--regardless of background or warfare
specialty. It may come as no surprise that adequate sealift is simply assumed,
and that the movement of cargo by merchant ships at sea appears wholly
transparent against the back-drop of flight operations, gunnery exercises, and
daily inspections. Even for surface warfare professionals, participation in an
underway replenishment (UNREP) with an MSC-operated tanker represents the
extent to which the U. S. Merchant Marine--and strategic sealift per se--is
incorporated into naval planning and thinking.
In undertaking this study, it is the intent of the author to examine
fundamental maritime issues involving merchant vessel and personnel
availability, and to assess their potential effects on sealift planning as the twenty-
first century approaches. This is not, however, a thesis which seeks to promote
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or justify the need to maintain-at any price-a healthy and prosperous American-
flag Merchant Marine. The argument for a healthy and robust Merchant Marine
shall stand on its own merits.
Herein lies the puzzle: given the post-Cold War political and budgetary
environment, which of the two critical variables- vessel or mariner availability-
will have the greater impact on strategic sealift, and what are the key
ramifications for naval planners? This research relies heavily on the plethora of
facts and figures derived from specific maritime studies as well as on a rich
review of the literature on this subject. In addition to literary research, every
effort was made to incorporate the views of government and maritime industry
representatives as primary source data.
C. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
As outlined previously, the U. S. Merchant Marine supports America's
national security requirements and objectives during times of peace and war. On
the one hand, merchant vessels and their crews ply the vast oceans, carrying
goods and materials to and from the United States and its foreign markets.
Certainly, these privately owned and operated ships maintain the critical
transoceanic link between our domestic economy and those of our competitors
and allies. If, however, the rationale (or criteria) for maintaining an American
Merchant Marine could be measured in economic terms according to profit and
loss, one might challenge the need for U. S.-flag commercial carriers.
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After all, merchant ships can be constructed and repaired faster and at less
cost at overseas shipyards. Indeed, foreign shipbuilders are not hamstrung by
minimum wages, overtime rates, or vociferous labor unions to the same degree
as their American counterparts. Neither are these shipyards hindered by
excessive government regulation and overt intervention. Similarly, foreign
shipping companies can operate their vessels at considerably less expense than
U. S.-flag carriers. These foreign ships are manned by fewer merchant seamen
who, by virtue of their lower standards of living, command neither the pay nor
the benefits which normally accrue to American mariners.
But national security is not simply an issue to be measured in terms of
economic profit and loss. On the contrary, a global military strategy that
embraces forward deployment of troops and forces overseas requires (and
assumes) sufficient lift to cover anticipated contingencies. As expressed by the
naval leadership in the joint Navy/Marine Corps White Paper "... From The Sea,"
sealift is an "enduring mission"-arguably, one that requires a dependable U. S.-
flag Merchant Marine. Today, the ability of the U.S. Merchant Marine to fulfill
the sealift requirements placed on it during a. national emergency by the DoD and
the MARAD is, at best, questionable.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
In the course of researching and writing this thesis, the author has made the
following assumptions:
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" that sustaining the U. S. Merchant Marine is vital to the economic and
military security of the United States;
" that the present policies and government regulations affecting the maritime
industry not only discourage private investment, but place it at a
disadvantage vis a vis other maritime nations;
"* that a few American shipbuilding and operating companies will continue to
survive in spite of depressed freight rates, tax disincentives, and reduced
federal subsidies, and;
"* that, selected interviews from a variety of sources would provide valuable
insight into the issues and problems currently facing the U. S. maritime
industry.
E. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis is organized into seven chapters: this introductory chapter, five
research chapters, and a conclusion based on the results of this research. Chapter
II provides an historical review of the U. S. Merchant Marine (and maritime
industry) from its colonial genesis to the commencement of Operation Desert
Shield. Chapter III examines not only the state of the Merchant Marine, but places
into context the status of maritime labor and domestic shipbuilding. Chapter IV
discusses the various programs and categories of sealift which are available to the
DoD and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). Given these sealift resources,
Chapter V of the thesis critiques the performance-and the availability-of U. S.-
flag ships and mariners during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
By highlighting the near-ideal politico-military circumstances surrounding
the Persian Gulf War, Chapter VI not only dispels the fallacy of employing a "best
case" mobilization to predict future sealift performance, but also discusses
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manning options (and opportunities) with an eye towards sealift planning for the
twenty-first century. And finally, Chapter VII presents the conclusions of the
Desert Shield/Storm case analysis and the supporting research. These conclusions
are solely those of the author and represent neither the views of the Department
of Defense, the Navy, the Maritime Administration, nor the maritime industry.
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II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since the earliest days of the Republic, merchant shipping and domestic
shipbuilding have been instrumental in defining and shaping the economic and
military potential of the United States. By any standard, though, the U. S.-flag
merchant marine has had a turbulent-and distinguished-past. Punctuated by
periods of extended conflict, the U. S. Merchant Marine has navigated the peaks
and valleys of government subsidies, freight rates, and wartime operations. In
order to appreciate the present state of the merchant marine, it is necessary to
examine its evolution and development. This chapter provides a brief history of
the U. S. Merchant Marine, giving due regard to the policies and legislation that
have affected the maritime industry.
A. THE EARLY YEARS
Although the focus of this historical review is the state of the U. S. maritime
industry since the unparalleled buildup of World War II, no examination would
be complete without including an appreciation of the pre-World War II trends in
U. S. shipping, shipbuilding, as well as related maritime legislation.
1. Evolution and Development
The United States originated from seafaring people. During the
seventeenth century, colonial settlers came to the new world from England on
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sailing ships. From those earliest days, the sea represented the economic and
communications nexus between England and its fledgling colonies. By 1638,
thirty-one years after the Plymouth Company failed in its first attempt to settle
a colony, the first American shipyard (employing sixty carpenters, fitters, and sail
makers) was established near Portland, Maine [Ref. l:p. 75]. Shipbuilding became
an increasingly important industry as American colonies settled near the ocean.
By 1676, shipbuilders of Boston had constructed thirty ships between 100 and 250
tons, 200 vessels between fifty and 100 tons, and roughly 500 ships of lesser
tonnage. Further, by the end of the 1700's, over 1,000 vessels were registered as
having been built in the New England area [Ref. 2:p. 47].
The early government of the United States recognized the necessity of
sustaining a strong merchant marine. Maintaining a fleet of U. S.-flag merchant
ships would ensure that critical trade routes could not be held hostage by foreign
governments seeking to impose their politico-economic will or by otherwise
unreliable foreign-flag shipping companies. From 1783 until a federal government
was established, the U. S. Merchant Marine fell victim to the protectionist trade
policies of Great Britain. Since America was no longer a colony, Britain not only
banned all U. S. vessels from British colony trade, but prohibited English trading
companies from purchasing American-built merchant vessels and goods. In
response, the first federal regulation affecting American-built ships was legislated
during the First Continental Congress in April, 1789. Congress ruled that only
American-built vessels could fly the American flag. Additionally, the Congress
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authorized a ten percent reductoun of import tariffs if the goods were carried in
U. S. hulls. [Ref. 2:pp. 50-51]
2. The Golden Years: 1789-1860
Between 1789 and 1828, Congress legislated over 50 tariff and shipping
laws intended to protect and nurture American ship operators and shipbuilders.
These laws contributed directly to the tremendous growth in the merchant
marine, from 123,893 tons on December 31, 1787, to 411,438 tons in 1792.' In
addition to import tax and flagging restrictions, foreign shipping companies were
subject to heavy taxation by individual states of the Union. Further, U. S.-built
and owned ships participating in coastwise trade were only required to pay
tonnage taxes once a year while foreign flag ships had to pay each time they
entered an American port. These practices made it unprofitable for foreign
shipping companies to operate in U. S. coastwise trade.2
Indeed, these were "golden years" for American merchant shipping and
shipbuilding. The period between 1820 and 1828 witnessed the continued growth
of the American-flag merchant fleet from 583,657 tons to 757,998 tons, and U. S.
bottoms carried ninety percent of all American commerce. Table 2.1 lists tonnages
I This represents a 232% increase in gross tonnage over five
years. For statistics on shipbuilding, see Clinton H Whitehurst,
Jr., The U. S. Shipbuildinq Industry: Past, Present, and Future,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1986.
2 These government-sponsored actions were a prelude to
cabotage, whereby foreign flag vessels were banned entirely from
domestic trade.
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TABLE 2.1 MERCHANT VESSELS BUILT AND DOCUMENTED
IN THE UNITED STATES FOR SELECTED YEARS
1798-1855














Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of U.S.. Colonial
Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960, p.4 4 8 .
'Includes canal boats and barges.
2 Data not available.
3 Figure computed from a nine month period.
built and documented in the United States between 1798 and 1855. The era of
wooden ships proved to be one of the high-water marks for American
shipbuilding.
It was during the period preceding the American Civil War that the first
government subsidy program was established. In 1847, Congress passed
legislation to give a U. S.-flag shipping company (American Collins Line) financial
aid so that it could compete with British operators. This direct subsidy allowed
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the company to design and invest in larger, faster, more efficient commercial
vessels. As a result of these capital expenditures, American Collins attracted a
larger percentage of the shipping market-to the detriment of England. Between
1847 and 1858, $14.4 million dollars was appropriated in subsidy payments to
American shipping companies. [Ref. 2: pp. 54-55]
3. The Civil War to 1936
Inasmuch as the period prior to the Civil War was considered the
"Golden Age" for American-flag shipping and shipbuilding, the Civil War
christened a prolonged period of stagnation and decline for the U. S. Merchant
Marine. Aside from the carnage endured by both sides, this period was
significant to the maritime industry for two important reasons. First, each side
ravaged the other's merchant vessels with stunning regularity. In fact, Southern
privateers claimed 110,000 tons of Northern shipping during the War [Ref. 2:p.
57]. The destruction of merchant vessels during the War had a profound effect
on waterborne commerce. Both U. S. and foreign shippers were loath to ship
goods in American hulls for fear of reprisal from the opposing side. Therefore,
U. S. shipowners saw no alternative other than to sell their vessels to foreigners.
Between 1861 and 1865, approximately one-third of the American merchant fleet
11
(751,595 tons) had been sold to foreign shipowners at a fraction of their original
cost.
3
In addition to the repercussions of the Civil War on U. S. shipping,
American shipbuilders were caught unprepared for the technological changes
that swept the maritime industry. With the advent of steel-hulled vessels and
steam power, foreign shipyards quickly bypassed the U. S. shipbuilding industry.
Although wood had been relatively abundant, the cost of iron to American yards
was much higher than that of their European counterparts. These advances
translated into faster, more efficient ships with high endurance and enhanced
cargo-carrying capacity. As a result of these technological changes and economic
realities, U. S. steel-hulled ships cost between forty to seventy-five percent more
than a European vessel of comparable displacement. As expected, U. S. shipping
capital flowed to overseas markets as investors turned to foreign yards--and
foreign registry-to remain competitive in a cutthroat industry. By 1901, the
American-owned, foreign-built (and registered) fleet consisted of 136 vessels,
totaling 672,000 tons [Ref. 2:pp. 57-58].
Not only was the maritime industry forced to adapt to these
technological changes, but U. S. shipping companies were plagued by declining
revenues (as a result of rail transportation) and by a shift in federal priorities. By
3 For a detailed analysis of Civil War shipping and
shipbuilding, see Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., The Defense
Transportation System: Competitor or Complement to the Private
Sector?, American Enterprise Institute for Pulblic Policy Research,
Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 11-12.
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1866, only thirty-two percent of Americanforeign commerce was carried by U. S.-
flag ships, and by 1890, only 12.8 percent was carried in U. S. hulls [Ref. 2:p. 58].
This negative trend deepened with the turn of the century. Only one American-
flag shipping company capable of transatlantic service remained in operation in
the final years of the nineteenth century, and by 1910, only 8.7 percent of foreign
trade was carried in American bottoms [Ref. 1: p. 82]. In any event, this heavy
reliance on foreign-flag ships to move American products abroad proved to have
dire consequences as the United States entered World War I.
At the beginning of World War I, foreign ships--previously available
to the American shipper-returned home to service their countries' wartime needs.
As nations withdrew their fleets from essential trade routes, and with virtually
no merchant marine to fill this transportation void (and demand), the United
States was incapable of providing for its economic well-being or satisfying its
military requirements. As a result, freight rates for goods bound for Europe and
elsewhere skyrocketed [Ref. 3:p. 14].' In response to this situation, the Congress
passed the Shipping Act of 1916. In addition to establishing a U. S. Shipping
Board for the purpose of "encouraging, developing and creating a naval auxiliary
... and a merchant marine" to meet the commercial demands and wartime needs
of the United States, the Act paved the way for the establishment of a
4 For instance, the freight rate on cotton from a Southern
U. S. port to Great Britain rose from $2.50 to $60 a bale. See
also: Edmund A. Walsh, Ships and National Safety: The Role of the
Merchant Marine in a Balanced Economy, Georgetown University Press,
Washington, D.C., 1934, p. 8.
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government-owned enterprise-the Emergency Fleet Corporation-to build,
operate, and own merchant vessels.' By 1922, the United States possessed a
formidable merchant fleet, totaling 13.5 millions tons (half of it government-
owned) at the price of $3.3 billion [Ref. 3 :p. 151. From the end of the World War
I until the early 1920's, a shipping boom existed due to the movement of men and
materials to and from European shores.
It should be noted that this buildup was neither inexpensive nor
efficient. Although the postwar U. S. Merchant Marine was at least five times
larger than the prewar fleet, a significant cost differential existed between
privately owned and government-owned shipyards. Private yards profited
through lump-sum and cost-plus contracts. Vessels built in private shipyards cost
the taxpayers in excess of two and one-half times the cost of those ships built in
government yards. Notwithstanding these costs, American yards delivered less
than one million tons by the end of the War--many ill-fitted for commercial use
[Ref. l:p. 851. Further, one-third of all vessels authorized for construction by the
U. S. Shipping Board were constructed after the armistice was signed! [Ref. 2:p.
65]
5 U. S. Congress, Shipping Act of 1916, Public Law No. 260,
64th Congress, First session, 1917, p. 1. The U. S. Shipping Board
was the forerunner of the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD).
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B. WORLD WAR 11
Following the cessation of hostilities after World War I, the government was
faced with having to decide what should be done with the merchant fleet. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as the Jones Act, was the
Congressional response. Section 1 of the Jones Act states:
That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its
foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to
carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military
auxiliary in time of war or national emergency ultimately to be owned and
operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to
develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and,
insofar as may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act, the
United States Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels and
shipping property as hereinafter provided, in the making of rules and
regulations, and in the administration of the shipping laws always in view
this purpose and object as the primary end to be obtained.
This legislation served two important purposes: first, to provide for the
transfer of the merchant fleet purchased by the U. S. Shipping Board during the
World War I to private shipping companies; and secondly, to establish an
arrangement under which those merchant vessels could compete successfully with
those of other nations [Ref. 2:p. 661. Of particular significance is the language of
the Act as it relates to the function of U. S.-flag ships during wartime. The Act
formally recognizes the auxiliary role of American merchant vessels during war
or crisis [Ref 4:p. 26].6
6 Further, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 established a
construction loan fund that made available low-interest capital to
potential shipowners. Although designed to stimulate shipbuilding,
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Due to the overwhelming number of ships available to U. S. shipping
companies in the early twenties, American-flag vessels accounted for fifty-one
percent of all waterborne commerce to and from the United States. Unfortunately
this market share was not maintained and, except for World War II, has fallen
ever since! The Jones Act failed to revive the Merchant Marine. A surplus of
aging ships, a decline in international trade as a result of the depression, and
mismanagement of government shipping discouraged the construction of new
vessels [Ref. l:p. 87]. Recognizing the need to reinvigorate the aner U. S.
Merchant Marine, Congress legislated on the eve of World War II a foundation
upon which a competitive (and militarily-useful) American merchant fleet would
be predicated. This foundation was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Prior to 1936, government aid programs were hidden under the pretense of
mail subsidy payments. President Franklin Roosevelt, convinced of the economic
and military need for a strong merchant marine, advocated an end to the
disguised subsidies. Instead, he proposed that the difference between U. S. and
foreign-flag costs in areas such as vessel construction, repairs, wages, insurance,
and subsistence, be paid by the federal government [Ref. 4:p. 26-27].
Additionally, national defense features (such as gun tubs) could be added at
the provision did not ac:.Leve its intended objective. An expanded
construction loan fund was authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of
1928.
' By 1933, the share of cargo carried by U. S.-f lag ships had
declined to thirty-three percent.
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government cost if approved by the Department of the Navy. The legislative
outcome of these proposals was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The
Declaration of Policy (Section 101 of the Act) still serves as the foundation of
federal policy with respect to the U. S. Merchant Marine and maritime industry:
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a)
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne export and import foreign
commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service essential for
maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce
at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time
of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United
States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as practical, (d) composed
of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed
in the United States and manned with trained and efficient citizen personnel,
and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the
development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.
Before discussing the unprecedented buildup of the U. S. Merchant Marine
during World War II, it is necessary to describe briefly the major provisions of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936. To create a fleet of U. S.-flag merchant ships, built
in American Shipyards, and owned and operated by American citizens, this Act
established a variety of direct and indirect subsidy programs--codified by
administrative Title.' Direct subsidy payments to shipowners included the
I The Act also established the U. S. Maritime Commission for
the purpose of administering the financial aid to ailing shipping
companies. Since that time, the promotional and regulatory duties
of the U. S. Maritime Commission were assigned to the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) in
1950 and 1961 respectively.
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Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) under Title V of the Act and the
Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS)-Title VI payments-of the Act.
CDS payments covered the difference in cost between a ship constructed or
repaired in an American shipyard and the cost of building or reconstructing an
identical vessel in a foreign yard. The intent of this subsidy program was to
foster the higher-cost American shipbuilding industry through cost parity.
Similarly, ODS payments were designed to encourage operation of U. S.-built
ships with American crews by covering the difference in operating costs between
American ship operators and their foreign counter-parts. Again, this subsidy was
intended to achieve a modicum of parity between U. S. and foreign shipping
companies.'
Several provisions of the Act provided indirect benefits to American
shipowners and operators. Although these subsidies did not involve the direct
outlay of government funds, they afforded monetary guarantees and awarded
' Operating costs include wages for officers and crew,
unemployment benefits, and marine insurance. ODS was limited,
however, to ships carrying cargo in an "essential service" of U. S.
foreign trade. An essential trade route is defined as a "route
between ports of the United States coastal area or areas to foreign
markets which has been determined ... to be essential for the
promotion, development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign
commerce of the United States." For a comprehensive review of
ODS/CDS, see: David Bess, Marine Transportation, The Interstate
Printers and Publishers, Inc., Danville, Ill., 1976, pp. 78-86;
Allen R. Ferguson et al, The Economic Value of the United States
Merchant Marine, The Transportation Center at Northwestern
University, Evanston, Illinois, 1961, p. 41; and Ernst G. Frankel,
ReQulation and Policies of American Shippinq, Auburn House
Publishing Company, Boston, 1982, pp. 50-57.
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preferential treatment to U. S. shipping companies. Specifically, Title XI insures
commercial loans and mortgages to U. S.-flag shipowners to finance a fixed
percentage of the construction, reconstruction, or repair costs for American-built
ships [Ref. 2:p. 89].10 Surely, the Federal Ship Mortgage and Loan Insurance
Program was popular with U. S. shipping companies. Not only could the
mortgage be extended to twenty-five years (covering the anticipated life of the
vessel), but permitted ship operators to finance their debt over the long term-
assuring a relatively stable income."1
By the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the U. S. Merchant Marine's
percentage of world tonnage had dropped to 16.6 percent. Although the
Neutrality Act of 1934 prohibited U. S.-flag vessels from entering the territorial
waters of any European belligerent, the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 not only allowed
the United States to circumvent neutrality laws, but also acted as a catalyst for the
depressed shipbuilding industry. Faced with the emergency demand for ships,
the U. S. Maritime Commission turned to private yards to mass-produce merchant
vessels. Once the Commission determined that existing yards could not satisfy
the overwhelming demand, it authorized the construction of government-owned
10 These loans guaranteed up to 87.5 percent of the cost for
non-subsidized vessels and a maximum of 75 percent for subsidized
ships.
"11 Although the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 reaffirmed several
earlier cargo preference provisions, the Cargo Preference Act of
1954 established the "50-50 rule" or cargo preference clause.
Under this provision, at least fifty percent of all government-
sponsored cargo must be transported on privately-owned U. S.-flag
commercial vessels (as available).
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shipyards. Again, as in World War I, the shipbuilding industry was able to
respond in time of need. An extraordinary number of ships were produced. In
all, over 6,400 merchant vessels, including 2,742 Liberty and 531 Victory-class
ships, were constructed between 1937 and 1945 [Ref. 5:p. 27].12
It must be remembered that ships represent only one-half of the shipping
equation. The fleet could not sail into harm's way without first having merchant
mariners trained to load, navigate, and operate those ships. Although there were
twenty-two national unions representing American seamen by 1943, by all
estimates it took four times as long to train a man for sea duty than to build a
merchant ship [Ref. 6:pp. 92-93]. The goal of the War Shipping Administration
was to train 250,000 merchant mariners for duties aboard ship. Officers in
training at the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point and other
government-funded schools were offered commissions as Ensigns, USNR, once
they passed their license examinations. Unlicensed seamen would "sign on"
through the union halls upon completion of a thirteen-week indoctrination course
12 Although the figures vary according to source, it is
generally accepted that the merchant fleet had quadrupled in number
of ships and quintupled in cargo capacity to 40 million tons--
representing sixty-percent of the world's tonnage--by the end of
World War II. In the aggregate, over 4 million men, women and
children produced over 36,960,592 tons of merchant shipping at a
cost of $12 billion. See also: Gerard J. Mangone, Marine Policy
for America, Lexington Books, 1977, pp. 90-91.
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[Ref. 7:p. 152]. Within a year of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, one hundred
thousand men were in various stages of the training pipeline."3
C. THE KOREAN WAR
Following World War IL, the United States was faced with having to dispose
of a surplus of general-purpose, government-owned merchant vessels. Despite
the wartime losses, a fleet of over 4,500 vessels-more than all other nations
combined-were available for sale [Ref. 2:p. 91]." To resolve this problem,
Congress enacted the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. Although this Act
provided the administrative guidelines for the demobilization and disposal of this
surplus fleet, the objective of the Act was to sell as many vessels as possible on
a priority basis to American shipping companies and then to allied nations. By
1950, 823 ships had been sold to U. S. citizens, and over 1,100 vessels had been
retailed for foreign registry [Ref. 2:p. 91].'" Those vessels not sold were either
" Two hundred million dollars had been spent on maritime
training over the course of the War. Despite their wartime
service, nearly 200,000 seamen discovered that there was no GI Bill
of Rights to provide loans, no education or insurance benefits as
was given to armed forces veterans. Additionally, monetary
compensation for injuries was difficult to obtain. See also: Felix
Riesenberg, Jr., Sea War: The Story of the U. S. Merchant Marine in
World War II, Rinehart and Company, Inc., New York, 1956, pp. 300-
301.
" 604 U. S. merchant ships were lost by direct enemy action
and another 139 vessels were sunk by maritime hazards as a result
of wartime conditions.
"s These sales reduced the American percentage of the world
shipping tonnage to 36.4 percent by 1948. The primary recipients
of these surplus vessels were the British, French, Danish and
Norwegian fleets. See Gerard J. Mangone, Marine Policy for
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scrapped or "mothballed" into the U. S. National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
for mobilization in future contingencies.
Like the post-World War I shipping environment, American-flag carriers
enjoyed the economic windfall of a post-War boom in maritime trade (at least
until the economies of Europe and Asia returned to pre-war conditions). With the
outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, tremendous demands again were
placed on U. S.-flag merchant shipping. The newly created Military Sea Transport
Service (MSTS) quickly activated its fleet of 174 merchant ships, including fifty
transports, forty-eight tankers, and twenty-five general-purpose (cargo) ships. In
addition to this mobilization, the MSTS expanded its sealift capability by calling
into service nearly 600 privately-owned and NDRF vessels [Ref. 3:p. 201.16
Unlike the chaotic experience of World War II, however, the government
had sufficient time to match manpower requirements to anticipated ship
activation schedules. (During World War II, the U. S. was forced to train
mariners at the same time that vessels were being built). For this crisis, former
seamen were recruited from shoreside jobs as ships were recalled to active service
from the NDRF and made ready for sea; [Ref. 4:p. 166]. With the end of
America: The United States at Sea, Lexington Books, 1977, p. 91.
•' In 1956, the Secretary of the Navy was given responsibility
for all sealift. For a detailed description of military
transportation management, see Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., The
Defense Transportation System: Competitor or Complement to the
Private Sector, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 20.
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hostilities in Korea, coupled with an economic recession, the American merchant
marine once again experienced a reduction in the global demand for transoceanic
shipping.
D. VIETNAM
The crisis in Southeast Asia placed a renewed demand on U. S.-flag
shipping. Although ninety-eight percent of all cargo destined for Vietnam was
carried by ship, the American merchant marine and shipbuilding industry fell
victim to depressed freight rates and foreign competition. Despite government-
sponsored CDS and ODS subsidies, the total amount of tonnage engaged in
foreign trade under the American flag scarcely increased in twelve years, from
9.14 million tons in 1950 to 10.2 million tons in 1962 [Ref. l:p. 91]. Further,
during the same twelve-year period, the share of U. S. foreign trade carried on
American-flag vessels declined steadily to only nine percent for all types of
cargoes."'
During the early part of the decade, two trends emerged in the shipbuilding
industry. Certainly, over the long-term, fewer vessels have been built in
American shipyards. Yet by 1960, the construction of general-purpose cargo ships
had given way to the fabrication of cargo-specific (and in some cases system-
17 By 1962, approximately twenty percent of all outbound cargo
from the U. S. fell under the cargo preference clause of the Cargo
Preference Act of 1954.
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specific) vessels." This shift towards greater vessel specialization not only
marked a fundamental transformation in the carriage of goods by sea, but
heralded a new era in shipbuilding technologies [Ref. 5:p. 281. Relatively slow
and inefficient breakbulk cargo ships were being replaced by the technologically
complex containership, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, liquid natural gas (LNG)
ships, and lighter aboard ship (LASH) vessels.
The second trend in American shipbuilding, one that affected all ships-
particularly petroleum and chemical tankers-concerned vessel size. Larger ships
with greater cargo-carrying capacities were built to take advantage of maritime
economies of scale. For U. S.-flag shipping companies, operating costs per voyage
(wages, fuel, and insurance) cut deeply into corporate profits. The most
economical solution was to build and operate fewer--but larger--ships. Mammoth
ships, such as very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and ultra large crude carriers
(ULCCs), were designed to maximize the shipping company's return on invest-
ment (ROI) while reducing ship operating costs. [Ref. 5:p. 28]
In 1965, the Department of Defense activated the National Defense Reserve
Fleet to assist active U. S.-flag merchant ships in delivering equipment to
Vietnam. From June 30, 1965 through June 30, 1969, over 16C ships were called
into service, repaired, and assigned to private shipping companies. Of the 33.2
million tons of cargo carried to Vietnam during this period, twenty-six percent
18 A "system" refers to the method of loading or unloading
cargo for a particular ship.
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was carried by Maritime Administration (MARAD) vessels, sixty-seven percent
by privately owned ships, and the remaining seven percent of the total tonnage
by MSTS owned (or chartered) vessels [Ref. l:p. 94].19 Again, as in the Korean
War, mariners were recruited directly from the union halls or from the pool of
former seamen to man these additional vessels.
Throughout the 1960's, the share of U. S. foreign commerce carried on
American-flag vessels continued to decline. In spite of the sealift required to
sustain military forces in Southeast Asia, by 1965 this share of tonnage had
decreased to 7.5 percent, and by 1969--the height of the Vietnam War--only 4.6
percent of foreign trade was shipped under the American flag [Ref. 8:p. 13].
Intense price competition from foreign-flag shipping companies and overseas
shipyards made it increasingly difficult for U. S. shipbuilders and operators to
attract business.
Another piece of legislation passed by Congress during the Vietnam War
was the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. Similar to the 1936 Act, this Act attempted
to improve the competitive standing of both the American Merchant Marine and
the U. S. shipbuilding industry. In order to increase the number of vessels built
in domestic shipyards, Congress mandated the construction of three hundred
19 The MSTS consisted of 436 vessels, including those
government-owned and chartered from shipping companies. See also:
Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., The Defense Transportation System:
Competitor or Complement to the Private Sector?, American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.,
1976, p. 21.
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ships between 1971 and 1980 [Ref. 2:p. 93]J. This Act encouraged the
construction of ships with standard designs which could be produced in series.
In addition to increasing Title XI (Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance) funds, The
Merchant Marine Act of 1970 permitted a shipbuilder to apply for and receive
Title V (CDS) funds directly from the federal government.2'
The Act also had far-reaching effects on the U. S. Merchant Marine. To
control the high cost of maintaining an American-flag fleet, the Act indexed
wages for seamen and officers and assigned an upper limit on Title VI (ODS)
subsidies. Further, crew size would be determined in the design/construction
phase rather than by union (or company) negotiation after the vessel was
launched [Ref. 4:p. 271. Lastly, the 1970 Act made ODS funds available to foreign
non-liner bulk trade. This provision enabled owners and operators of
oil/bulk/ore (OBO) ships to compete on an even keel with their foreign-flag
rivals [Ref. 2:p. 95].
20 The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 would provide an average of
thirty ships per year to be constructed in U. S. yards. Such a
production "run" would not only help to make shipyards more cost
efficient, but could help to stabilize a relatively perishable
workforce.
21 The Act also created the Commission on American
Shipbuilding. The Commission was empowered to investigate, report
on, and recommend changes to the shipbuilding industry.
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E. THE REAGAN BUILD-UP (OR BUILD-DOWN?)
At the time of President Reagan's inauguration in January, 1981, the average
age of the American merchant fleet was twenty-three years. Although the
number of U. S.-flag vessels continued to decline steadily, the fact that older,
relatively inefficient ships were being retained in commercial service actually
caused the total cargo carrying capacity of the U. S. Merchant Marine to increase.
Faced with another shipping recession, American-flag shipping companies had
no choice but to pursue a competitive advantage over foreign-flag companies
through improved economies of scale.
In retrospect, with the new President came a renewed sense of hope in the
maritime industry. Promises of a 600-ship Navy by the President, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy only fueled the industry-wide
optimism. By revising the tax laws in 1981 (and retaining the investment tax
credit for capital purchases), the Reagan Administration appeared to be
committed to a strong defense infrastructure as well as a revitalized maritime
industry. Despite these encouraging signals, the Administration eliminated
Construction Differential Subsidy (Title V) funds from the FY-82 budget proposal.
Additionally, Title XI (Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance) funds were curtailed
[Ref. 5:p. 28, 421.' As expected, these funding drawdowns had a profound
effect on American shipowners and shipbuilders alike. On the one hand,
22 Although the last CDS contracts were written in FY-81,
existing CDS commitments were honored by the federal government.
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shipowners and operators saw no fiscally-sound alternative other than to
construct new vessels--and periodically repair those in service-at foreign
shipyards. On the other hand, private shipyards sustained the brunt of the
budgetary cuts. With the lack of domestic commercial shipbuilding and repair,
these privately-owned yards came to rely heavily on naval construction and depot
availabilities to meet their payrolls. However, naval contracts were not a panacea
for the shipbuilding industry. Not only was competition for government
contracts between private shipyards keen, but each was obliged to compete
against eight government-owned facilities as well [Ref 5.:p. 28].
In the spring of 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Shipping Act of
1984. This Act not only relaxed restrictions on shipping conferences that limit
and control competition, but also expanded antitrust immunity for U. S.-flag liner
companies engaged in foreign trade.3 To a certain degree, the Act deregulated
American-flag liner companies. In doing so, shipping companies engaged in
foreign trade were better able to compete successfully in the international
shipping market. [Ref. 5:p. 41]
At the time of George Bush's inauguration in January, 1989, the American-
flag fleet ranked eighth behind Cyprus in deadweight tonnage (DWT).24
"23 A shipping conference is the mechanism by which price
setting is established, and specific routes and cargoes divided
among companies.
"24 Liberia, Panama, and Japan, respectively, ranked at the top
among the maritime nations of the world in DWT. Further, the
American fleet (privately-owned) ranked eleventh in ships
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Although eight vessels were delivered to U. S. ship operators during the previous
fiscal year, twenty-nine merchant ships (totaling 536,515 DWT) were stricken from
the U. S. register and scrapped [Ref. 9:p. 39]. Following the inauguration of
President Bush, the Department of Transportation articulated a new National
Transportation Policy on March 7,1990. This Policy acknowledged the depressed
state of the maritime industry:
The U. S. Merchant Marine and shipbuilding industries Have declined
steadily in recent decades. It is clear that Federal programs, including cargo
preference rules and direct subsidies, have not succeeded in keeping the U.S.
flag Merchant Marine fleet viable and competitive in world trades. Many
of the program provisions are anachronisms and an ill-advised burden on
the Nation's Merchant Marine.
In keeping with this public proclamation, the downward trend in dead-
weight tonnage and number of ships continued.2 By January, 1, 1990, the active
fleet had dropped to 407 vessels (of 1,000 gross tons and over). Further, the share
of tonnage carried by American-flag ships had deteriorated to 4.4 percent [Ref.
10:p. 13].26 Table 2.2 ranks the merchant fleets of the world according to DWT
and numbers of ships. As illustrated in this table, the U. S. Merchant Marine
(oceangoing steam and motor vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over).
25 Released by the President on March 8, 1990, the National
Transportation Policy (NTP) stressed the importance of the maritime
industry to naval sealift.
26 Despite an exhaustive ten-month DoT evaluation and
assessment of U. S. National Transportation Policy in FY-90, few
legislative and policy gains were achieved. For a detailed
narrative of maritime legislative efforts, see U. S. Department of
Transportation, MARAD '90, The Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration, 1991.
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ranked fourteenth in number of vessels, and ninth in deadweight tonnage on the
eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. In fact, no new commercial
vessels (of 1,000 gross tons or larger) were delivered by private shipyards in FY-
1990 [Ref. 10:p. 1]. Within days following this invasion, the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) requested activation of all seventeen roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)
vessels in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This petition for sealift by the MSC
marked the beginning of what would be the largest recall and activation of the
U. S. Merchant Marine since the Vietnam War. An analysis of the U. S. sealift
effort during Operations Desert Shield and Storm is provided in Chapter V.
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TABLE 2.2 MAJOR MIERCHAINT FLEETS OF THE WVORLD AS OF
JANUARY 1, 1990
Country Number of Ships' Rank DWT (000) Rank
Liberia 1,409 3 88,275 1
Panama 3,189 1 70,537 2
Greece 914 7 36,537 3
Japan 1,007 6 36,237 4
Cyprus 1,054 5 29,729 5
Norway 587 8 28,800 6
USSR 2,428 2 25,735 7
Britain 2  545 10 24,810 8
United States 407 14 20,439 9
Bahamas 530 11 19,719 10
China 1,281 4 19,611 11
Philippines 558 9 14,948 12
South Korea 429 13 11,909 13
Singapore 407 15 11,494 14
Italy 479 12 10,514 15
All Others3  7,759 155,195
TOTAL 22,983 604,489
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD '90, The Annual
Report of the Maritime Administration, April, 1991.
Ocean-going merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
2 British Dependent Territories.
SIncludes 248 U.S. Government-owned ships of 3,978,000 DW1T.
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111. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY
Today, the U. S. maritime industry triad-the components of which include
commercial ship operating companies, ship construction and repair facilities, and
maritime labor-are in immediate jeopardy of becoming lost to foreign
competition and legislative procrastination. Further, the fact that the maritime
industry is segregated along professional lines not only contributes to, but also
magnifies the difficulty in reaching equitable solutions to industry-wide problems.
As to be expected, each faction tends to assume unique, self-serving positions on
common issues including retirement plans and benefits; even closely-allied
industries or companies rarely agree on specific issues. The lack of consensus and
open rivalry among and between elements of this triad has prevented the U. S.
maritime industry from attaining the level of solidarity needed to compete in the
international shipping market or stimulate domestic maritime reform.
A. MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD
In the three years since the sealift buildup for Operations Desert Shield and
Storm, the position of the United States vis a vis other maritime nations has
continued to deteriorate. According to MARAD data, the privately-owned U. S.
merchant fleet fell in ranking from fourteenth to sixteenth in numbers of ships,
and from ninth to tenth place in total DWT [Ref. 11:p. 14]. Not only did the
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United States rank behind the Bahamas (a favorite choice as a flag of convenience)
and the People's Republic of China in both categories, but as a percentage of
oceanborne foreign trade, the share of commercial freight carried on American-
flag bottoms dropped to 4.0 percent by the close of 1991 [Ref. 11:p. 15].'
Further, at a time when U. S. shipping is experiencing negative growth, three of
the top ten merchant fleets have realized remarkable growth. Of these leading
maritime countries, Liberia, Panama, and the Bahamas individually registered
fleet DWT growth in excess of 2 million gross tons in 1992 [Ref. 12:p. 1451.
This precipitous decline in the U. S.-flag merchant fleet vis a vis other
maritime nations cannot be viewed simply as an economic issue devoid of
military significance. The shortage of U. S.-flag sealift is not a problem that can
be dismissed under the rubric of maritime "survival of the fittest," or relegated to
career-minded bureaucrats for prompt legislative action. On the contrary, as
demonstrated in Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the lack of a healthy and
robust U. S.-flag Merchant Marine (and maritime infrastructure) will impact
adversely on the ability of USTRANSCOM, through MSC and MTMC, to move
equipment and supplies to distant theaters in support of national (and
multinational) objectives.
27 Based on preliminary data.
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B. MARITIME PROMOTIONAL POLICIES
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 put into place a variety of legislative
mechanisms to reinvigorate the U. S. maritime industry including differential
payments and a ship mortgage insurance program. Although the Annual Report
of the Maritime Administration for fiscal year 1992 reveals eleven ODS (Title VI)
contracts covering fifty-four liner vessels and fifteen contracts covering thirty-one
vessels in the bulk trades, all ODS subsidies are due to expire on December 31,
1997.28
In contrast to the $215.7 million in net ODS outlays during FY-1992, the
Construction Differential Subsidy (Title V) payments ceased in FY-1989. In fact,
no CDS contracts have been let since FY-1981. Table 3.1 provides a synopsis of
government ODS and CDS outlays by fiscal year. In total, over $13.1 billion in
ODS/CDS subsidies has been channeled into the U. S. Merchant Marine and
maritime industry.
C. THE AMERICAN OCEANGOING FLEET
At the commencement of FY-1993, the privately-owned, deep-draft American
Merchant Marine (including the Great Lakes Fleet) totaled 425 ships with a cargo
28 According to press reports, the Clinton Administration has
decided to allow all ODS agreements to expire. See: Don Phillips,
"White House Plans to Halt Subsidies for Merchant Fleet,"
Washington Post, 1993, pp. A-I and A-19, col.l.
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TABLE 3.1 MARITIME SUBSIDY OUTLAYS, 1936 - 1992
Fi•a You Toud CDS Total ODS Total ODS & CDS
1936-1955 251,607,830 341,109.987 592,717,817'
1956-1960 164,687,414 644,115,146 808,802,560
1961 101,361,086 150,142,575 251,503,661
1962 131,713,238 181,918,756 320,631,994
1963 93,417,209 220,676.6.5 314,093,894
1964 78,273,410 203,036,844 281,310,254
1965 86,135,010 213,334,409 299,469,419
1966 72,018,076 186,628,357 258,646,433
1967 81,087,566 175,631,860 256,719,426
1968 96,086,293 200,129,670 296,215,963
1969 94,010,178 194,702,569 288,712,747
1970 95,252,247 205,731,711 300,983,958
1971 135,088,321 268,021,097 403.109,418
1972 141,698,479 235,666,830 377,365,310
1973 185,568,541 226,710,926 412,279,467
1974 198,905,452 257,919,080 456,824,532
1975 239,795,663 243,152,340 482,948,003
1976 243,712,448 386.433,994 630,146,442
1977 218,531,643 343,875,521 562,407,164
1978 156,009,547 303,193,575 459,203,122
1979 200,776,929 300,521,683 501,298,612
1980 265,079,866 341,368,236 606,448,102
1981 208,113,192 334,853,670 542,966,862
1982 184,485,217 400,689,713 585,174,350
1983 84,511,019 368,194,331 452,705,350
1984 13,694,523 384,259,674 397,954,197
1985 4,692.013 351,730,642 356,422,655
1986 -416,673 287.760,640 287,343,867
1987 420,700 227,426,103 227,846,803
1988 1,236,679 230,188,400 231,425,079
1989 0 212,294,812 212,294,812
1990 0 230,971,797 230,971,797
1991 0 217,574,038 217,574,038
1992 0 215,650,854 215,650,854
TOTAL 3,834,553,116 9,285,616,426 13,120,169,542
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, A, The Annual Report
If the Maritime Administration, May, 1993.
'Includes CDS outlays during World War 11, as well as the Mariner (Class) Ship
Construction Program.
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carrying capacity of roughly 19.5 million DWT [Ref. 11: p. 8].' Statistics pub-
lished by Lloyd's Register of Shipping indicate that the United States logged the
single greatest reduction of any maritime nation-down 2,062,000 GRT from 1991.
Additionally, that segment of the American fleet engaged in international "liner"
service has waned to just eight operating companies and 110 ships [Ref. 12:p.
145]. The oceangoing U. S. Merchant Marine is classified in Table 3.2 according
to type, number of ships, DWT, and average age. As illustrated in Table 3.2, the
U. S. merchant fleet is composed mostly of tankers and intermodal vessels
(including containerships, LASH vessels and RO/ROs). Although intermodal-
type ships are among the youngest and most efficient in the American Merchant
Marine, the bulk of the fleet DWT resides with relatively old tankers.
Certainly, civilian policymakers and military planners are concerned by the
decline in the number of oceangoing ships flying the American flag. However,
the fact that the average age of the fleet is 18 years should not be dismissed
lightly. As ships near the end of their (projected) commercial service lives,
shipowners must begin to consider economically-viable alternatives to remain
competitive with their foreign counterparts. This is particularly true for
shipowners engaged in the tanker trade. As material condition, age, and concerns
over vessel safety combine with the absence of government CDS/ODS funding,
29 The Oceangoing component of the U. S. merchant fleet
consisted of 386 vessels, of which 348 ships of 17.1 million DWT
were active. The remaining 38 vessels were laid up in inactive
status.
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TABLE 3.2 U.S. OCEANGOING MERCHANT FLEET
SPRING, 1993
PRIVATELY-OWNED VESSELS'
Type Number of Ships DWT (000) Average Age
Combo2  3 30 41
Breakbulk 36 605 21
Bulk 19 893 16
Intermodal3  128 3,836 15LNG 13 936 14
Tanker 169 12,591 21l
Tug/Barge- 18 640 12
TOTAL 386 19,531 18
Sources: Table 3.2 represents a fusion of two U.S. Department of
Transportation Tables: Maritime Industry Key Statistics, Spring, 1993,
and MARAD .92, The Annual Report of the Maritime Administration,
May, 1993, p. 12.
'Figures include the active and inactive fleet.
2The term "Combo" refers to combination passenger-cargo ships.
* "Intermodal" vessels include container ships, barge-carrying vessels, and
RO/ROs.
depressed freight rates, and prohibitively high operating expenses, shipowners
will be forced to adjust to market dynamics. This economic adjustment can take
many forms: shipowners may opt to transfer their active ships to a "flag of
convenience;" or they may choose to build new vessels at considerably less
expense in foreign shipyards. Another less attractive alternative would be to sell
(or scrap) the ships at market value. In any event, considering that the expected
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life of a merchant vessel is between 20 and 25 years, many shipowners are fast
approaching (and in most cases have reached) this decision threshold.'
D. U. S. SHIPBUILDING, CONVERSION, AND REPAIR
The U. S. shipbuilding industry has gone without government subsidies
since 1981. At a time when countries engaged in shipbuilding were escalating aid
programs for their respective yards, the Reagan Administration unilaterally
terminated the CDS program for U. S.-flag vessels built in American shipyards.
According to John Stocker, President, Shipbuilders Council of America, foreign
governments not only drove unsubsidized American shipyards out of the
commercial shipbuilding business through direct and indirect support of
shipowners and builders, but "encouraged the dumping of ships on an
unprecedented scale" [Ref. 13:p. 3].31 Table 3.3 provides a summary of ships on
"30 In 1992, the chief executive officers of American President
Companies, Ltd. and CSX Corporation announced that unless maritime
reforms applicable to liner vessels engaged in foreign trade were
adopted, American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) and Sea-Land Service,
Inc. (Sea-Land) would reflag their U. S.-flag ships to foreign
registry beginning in 1995. Another American-flag steamship
company--Lykes Brothers Steamship Company--recently transferred
part of its fleet to foreign-flag.
"3' In addition to ship financing and direct shipyard aid (in
the form of government loans, guarantees, and grants), many
shipbuilding nations provide funding for R&D. Since 1988, the
average annual shipbuilding aid budgets for South Korea, Germany,
and Japan--the top three OECD shipbuilding subsidizers
respectively--have totaled 6.6 billion dollars collectively. For
a detailed analysis of foreign shipbuilding subsidies, refer to:
Shipbuilders Council of America, International Shipbuilding Aid:
ShipbuildinQ Aid Practices of the Tor OECD Nations and Their Impact
on U. S. Shiipyards, June, 1993.
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TABLE 3.3 WORLD MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING AS
OF OCTOBER 1, 1992
SHIPS ON ORDER OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Rank Country DWT (000) % of World
Total
1 Japan 23,073 37.1
2 South Korea 13,944 22.4
3 Denmark 3,579 5.7
4 China 3,578 5.7
5 Taiwan 2,411 3.9
6 Romania 2,114 3.4
7 Brazil 1,712 2.8
8 United Kingdom 1,628 2.6
9 Germany 1,488 2.4
10 Poland 1,482 2.4
All Others 7,235 11.6
TOTAL 62,244
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Industry Key Statistics, Maritime Administration,
Spring, 1993.
order or under construction as of October ', 1992. Not surprisingly, Japan and
South Korea top the list of states with robust shipbuilding programs. In both
cases, efficient practices at the shipyard worker level were accompanied by
agressive subsidy programs to produce state-of-the-art ships at less expense (and
more quickly) than U. S. shipyards.
In stark contrast, only one shipbuilding order for a vessel larger than 1,000
gross tons was placed with a U. S. shipyard in FY-1992. In fact, National Steel
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TABLE 3.4 U.S. SHIPBUILDING ORDERBOOK (Military and





Aircraft Carriers 2 158,000
Submarines 18 140,500
Other2  12 195,732
Auxiliary Ships 4 38,982
T-Ships3  13 127,655
Commercial 2 20,617'
TOTAL 79 868,548
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Industry Key
ais•ic., Maritime Administration, Spring, 1993.
'Military -1,000 LDT and over; Commercial -1,000 GRT and over.
"2 'Other" includes Amphibious Assault Ships (LHDs), Dock Landing Ships
(LSDs), and Mine Countermeasures Ships (MCMs).
' "T" designates civilian-manned ships, both government-owned and
privately-owned, operated by or under charter to the Military Sealift
Command (MSC).
'Approximate tonnage.
and Shipbuilding Co. delivered the first large (713 ft.) commercial vessel to
Matson Navigation since 1987. Table 3.4 demonstrates clearly that the workload
in American shipyards is driven by Navy ship construction contracts rather than
by orders for commercial vessels. Some suggest that unless there is a resurgence
of commerciai shipbuilding activity within the next few years, most of the
privately-owned shipyards will be forced to close by 1998 [Ref. 14 :p. iii].
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In addition to new ship construction, privately-owned shipyards have been
awarded ship conversion contracts recently by the Departments of Defense and
Transportation. On July 30, 1993, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
awarded contracts to two shipbuilding companies for five RO/RO-type vessels.
These ships will be modified to meet the performance-based criteria defined by
the Department of Defense Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). Of the five
vessels, three former MAERSK L Class ships will be converted at National Steel
and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in San Diego; and two vessels-purchased
from the East Asiatic Company--will be serviced at Newport News Shipbuilding.
All five ship conversions are scheduled for delivery to the U. S. Navy by
December, 1995. [Ref. 15132
Within the last year, the Department of Transportation also purchased
twelve RO/RO-type vessels for inclusion into the MARAD-controlled Ready
Reserve Force (RRF). Acquired from a variety of foreign- and American-flag
shipowners, these twelve RO/RO vessels will undergo an "upgrading process" at
private shipyards prior to MARAD acceptance. It is expected that U. S. Coast
Guard-mandated upgrades, coupled with pre-delivery drydockings and DoD-
sponsored installations of selected defense features, could stimulate "more than
32 These five vessels are the first of twenty MRS-directed
Large Medium-Speed RO/Ros (LMSRs) to be acquired through new
construction or conversion.
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$60 million of shipyard work to be performed at private U. S. repair facilities."
[Ref. 161m
E. MARITIME INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
Employment statistics in all sectors of the U. S. maritime industry--seagoing,
longshore, and shipyard-continue to reflect the depressed state of the
international shipping market and the decrease in the number of U. S.-flag ships.
Table 3.5 provides a breakdown of maritime billets within each employment
category.3' In relative terms, seagoing employment aboard American-flag ships
experienced the largest drop of any maritime category, plummeting 20.64% in the
total number of billets from 1991 levels. Although deactivation of government-
owned vessels in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War accounts for the majority
of billets lost during the reporting period, this reduction in the number of
government-sponsored positions must not disguise the fact that the number of
commercial billets available aboard U. S.-flag ships continues to fall in response
to market demand.
In absolute terms, however, shipyard labor experienced the largest reduction
of any maritime category. According to MARAD data introduced in Table 3.5,
33 See also: U. S. Department Of Transportation, "Ready Reserve
Force Acquisitions," Maritime Administration, June, 1993.
34 Whereas seagoing and shipyard employment is related directly
to domestic (both commercial and government) needs, longshore
employment is largely a function of the volume of traffic--
regardless of flag--through U. S. ports.
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TABLE 3.5 MARITIME EMPLOYMENT (Billets)




Total Billets' 11,584 9,193 20.64
Shipyard Employment:
Production Workers 63,970 56,966





Great Lakes 1,071 1,077
Total Labor 25,629 25,103 2.05
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Industry Key
Statistics, Maritime Administration, Spring, 1993.
'Includes billets aboard government-owned NDRF ships activated and
operated under Ship Manager contracts.
over 10,000 shipyard jobs were lost in the preceding year. This reduction in the
labor force can be attributed to a number of factors including: the reduction in the
number of "new construction" contracts awarded by the U. S. Navy; non-existent
commercial orders, and intense foreign competition. It is important to note that
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this 11.08% reduction in the number of shipyard billets lost does not include labor
force reductions in peripheral industries. Although related directly to shipyard
activity, layoffs in shipyard supplier and "second tier" support industries (such
as component manufacturers) are independent of this equation.
And finally, due in part to the volume of activity at major coastal (and
inland) ports as well as the bargaining power of the local labor unions, longshore
employment at U. S. port facilities fell a relatively modest two percent between
1991 and 1992. In spite of the net decrease in the absolute size of the work force,
Gulf Coast ports realized an increase in the number of longshore jobs during the
calendar year.
F. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Following the announcement by American President Lines (APL) and Sea-
Land that they would reflag their vessels to foreign-flag registry if changes to
existing maritime policies and regulations were raot adopted, these two shipping
companies jointly authored a propo,:.l for maritime reform designed to make all
American-flag shipping companies more competitive with their foreign-flag
counterparts. On June 10, 1992, a joint APL/Sea-Land proposal was introduced
in Congress [Ref. 17:p. 17]. This maritime reform package, entitled the 'V. S. Flag
Liner Service International Competitiveness Act," targeted three areas for
regulatory and legislative improvement.
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1. U. S.-Flag Liner Service International Competitiveness Act
The joint APL/Sea-Land legislative proposal focused on three areas of
concern to U. S. shipping companies: international maritime standards for design,
equipment, maintenance, and operation of U. S.-flag liner vessels; tax
competitiveness; as well as defense logistical readiness. It was believed that
modifications to existing statutes and administrative regulations would promote
and generate growth in the U. S. maritime industry.
a. International Maritime Standards
In order for American-owned shipping companies to fly the U. S.
flag, they must satisfy stringent-and expensive-safety requirements.35 On the
other hand, foreign-flag shipping companies, free from the regulatory grip of the
Coast Guard, ply the seas unfettered by costly U. S. standards. In fact, foreign
ship operators are exempt from American safety requirements even when
operating in U. S. waters. Quite simply, maritime classification societies such as
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) hold their constituencies to much
less demanding standards than are required under U. S. law.
Not surprisingly, this two tier approach to maritime safety has
evolved into an economic issue with American-flag shipowners and operators.
Because higher regulatory requirements translate into increased capital outlays,
American shipowners operate at a distinct cost disadvantage vis a vis other
35 Safety requirements for all American-f lag ships are
administered by the U. S. Coast Guard.
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maritime nations. It should come as no surprise that many U. S. shipowners have
chosen to transfer their vessels to foreign-flag registry in such a competitive
environment. Under this joint proposal, safety requirements would be
administered by maritime classification societies rather than by the U. S. Coast
Guard. This administrative shift would not only relieve American shipowners
and operators from the financial burden associated with exceptionally high
construction and operating standards, but would encourage those who transferred
their commercial fleets to "flags of convenience" to reflag their vessels to U. S.
registry. [Ref. 17:p. 18]'
b. Tax Competitiveness
Secondly, the tax regime under which the maritime industry
operates has been the focus of intense scrutiny and debate. Another facet of the
APL/Sea-Land proposal involved modifying the long-term depreciation schedules
of U. S.-flag vessels and the assessed penalties for repair work completed in
foreign shipyards. For tax purposes, U. S.-flag vessels are depreciated on the
basis of an expected life of ten years. APL and Sea-Land proposed that the
depreciation period for all vessels engaged in liner trades be reduced to three
years. [Ref. 17:p. 18]
"36 Not only would this proposal abolish the higher construction
and stability standards on American-flag vessels, but also would
eliminate the requirement for newly reflagged ships to wait three
years before they are eligible to carry government-impelled
cargoes.
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Among the other APL/Sea-Land recommendations geared towards
improving the tax competitiveness of American-flag shipowners and operators
was a proposal to eliminate the ad valorem duty for all repair work performed in
foreign shipyards. Currently, the U. S. government assesses a 50% duty (fine) on
all repairs to American-flag upon their return to the United States. By eliminating
this duty, Ame. ican shipowners and operators would be able not only to compete
on a more level playing field against foreign-flag shipping companies, but also to
reinvest funds formerly earmarked for ad valorem payment into capital
improvements. [Ref. 17:p. 18]
c. Defense Logistical Readiness
Finally, APL and Sea-Land proposed establishing a program under
which the Department of Defense would be required to depend on American-flag
carriers "whenever they are reasonably available to r.arry DoD cargoes" [Ref. 17:p.
191. Not only would this Act create peacetime and contingency contracting
procedures, but it would ensure that commercial operators are compensated fairly
for actual carriage of DoD cargo as well as for their commitment to make their
ships available in the event of a national emergency. Further, the Act would
require that the DoD engage in "joint contingency planning" with representatives
from the U. S. maritime industry [Ref. 17:p. 191.
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2. Maritime Reform Act of 1992
As a result of the APL/Sea-Land proposal, the President formed a
maritime policy coordinating group in 1992. Chaired by the Secretary of
Transportation, the maritime policy coordinating group developed a statement of
principles which was presented to both the Senate Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the House on
June 17 and July 8, 1992 respectively. Some of these principles were incorporated
into (and served as the basis for) a proposed Maritime Reform Act of 1992. [Ref.
17:pp. 20-23]
Transmitted by the Secretary of Transportation to Congress on July 17,
1992, this Act-introduced as resolutions H.R. 5627 and S.R. 3047--contained
provisions involving the use of Capital Construction Funds (CCF), carriage of
preference cargoes, and the elimination of the ad valorem tax on U. S.-flag ships
for repairs completed in foreign shipyards. In addition to these provisions, this
proposed Act would establish a Contingency Retainer Program for seventy-four
American-flag ships through FY-2000.37 Although this retainer program was
designed to assure the availability of U. S.-flag merchant ships to meet national
security requirements, it would serve to bolster American presence in the
international commercial shipping market. It was proposed that ship operators
" This Program would apply mainly to vessels under fifteen
years of age. U. S.-flag ships over this age limit could
participate if they were transferred from an ODS agreement to the
proposed Contingency Retainer Program.
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would receive 2.5 million in funding per ship per year commencing in FY-94. By
FY-2000, this retainer payment would be phased down to 1.6 million per vessel.
[Ref. 17:pp. 22-24]
3. Maritime Security Fleet Program of 1993
The proposed Maritime Reform Act of 1992 received mixed responses
from the maritime industry. On the one hand, shipyards objected to the lack of
fiscal protection from subsidized foreign shipyard competition. On the other
hand, some American shipping companies objected because the proposed Act did
not include some type of CDS funding for new ship construction. And still others
opposed the Act because the Contingency Retainer Program covered only a seven-
year period instead of the preferred duration of ten years [Ref. 17:p. 24].
The 1992 session of Congress adjourned without substantive action on
the proposed Maritime Reform Act of 1992. Chief among the legislative obstacles
was the inability to fund the Maritime Reform Act. Not only did the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) mandate that the entire seven-year program
be funded in the FY-1993 budget, but there existed a shortfall of $300 million to
be covered in the budget process.' An effort was made to transfer this $300
million from DoD coffers to the DoT. The DoD objected strongly to the use of
DoD-appropriated funds for the Contingency Retainer Program. The Department
of Defense argued successfully that the Contingency Retainer Program should be
38 The cost of the Contingency Retainer Program was estimated
to be $1.1 billion.
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based "solely on economic findings, not on defense findings" [Ref. 17 :p. 25]. In
essence, the DoD took the position that a merchant ship retainer program was not
needed to satisfy current (or projected) sealift requirements.
In the wake of this legislative inaction, U. S.-flag liner companies
operating dry cargo ships in foreign trade proposed in February, 1993, a
"Maritime Security Fleet Program" to revitalize the ailing industry.' At the heart
of the proposal was the establishment of a 15-year payment (subsidy) program
to American shipowners engaged in liner service. Shipowners participating in
this Program would be paid $2.5 million per ship per year for up to 110 U. S.-flag
liner and RO/RO vessels.' Originally intended to begin on October, 1, 1993,
this program would be renewable in fifteen-year increments. In return for these
payments, American shipowners would guarantee liner service or charters at fair
and reasonable rates to the DoD.
If adopted, this "Maritime Security Fleet Program" would eliminate
"discriminatory" statutes including the 50% ad valorem duty for repairs performed
in foreign shipyards, as well as the three-year waiting period for government
preference cargoes after a foreign-built (or registered) vessel was put under the
U. S. flag. Additionally, those federal regulations which establish vessel design,
safety, and construction standards would be modified to conform with lower-and
", These American shipping companies included APL, Central Gulf
and Waterman Steamship, Crowley Maritime, Farrell Lines, Lykes
Brothers, and Sea-Land.
40 Annual payments would be indexed for inflation.
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less expensive-international requirements [Ref. 17:pp. 27-291. Although this
program was presented to the Secretary of Transportation on March 2, 1993, no
action has been taken on this jointly-sponsored package.
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IV. SEALIFT AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
On October 5, 1989, President George Bush signed a National Security
Directive which reaffirmed the relationship between the commercial sealift
capability and national defense. The National Security Sealift Policy is based on
the principle that:
Sealift is essential both to executing this country's forward defense strategy
and to maintaining a wartime economy. The United States' national sealift
objective is to ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources
will be available to meet defense deployment, and essential economic
requirements in support of our national security strategy. The broad
purpose of the sealift policy is to ensure that the U. S. maintains the
capability to meet sealift requirements in the event of crisis or war.
America is still a maritime nation. On the economic front, the United States
remains the world's largest exporter with sales totaling $591 billion dollars in 1991
[Ref. 18: p. 9]. According to the current (1993) National Security Strategy,
America's long-term economic strategy must include an "improved infrastructure,
particularly in transportation" [Ref. 18:p. 10]. Certainly, the maritime component
of America's transportation infrastructure has played (and will play) a
fundamental role in America's foreign commerce and economic prosperity."1
"41 For the purposer of this study, the author has adopted a
definition of foreign "commerce" (or "trade") from M. Rosenblatt
and Son, Inc., The National Defense Relevance of the World's Dry
Cargo Contract Fleet, U. S. Department of Commerce National
Technical Information Service, Washington, D.C., June, 1982, p. 2-
1: "Commerce is defined as the transportation of seaborne cargo
anywhere in the world, and any ship which is engaged in such
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Over the past ten years, however, the maritime industry has been adrift in
a sea of legislative inlction, regulatory indecision, and industry-wide factionalism.
Fraught with partisan and parochial bickering, relations among shipowners,
maritime labor unions, operators, management companies, and shipbuilders have
been motivated by greed. Now, faced with the fiscal reality of shrinking
government outlays and contracts (coupled with foreign competition), the
maritime industry is driven by the most basic of needs: self-preservation. Clearly,
this "me first" attitude has hindered past efforts by government and industry
leaders to present a unified maritime front and has contributed, at least in part,
to the downfall of the maritime industry. Indeed, the U. S. Merchant Marine and
the shipbuilding industry continue to operate at a fiscal and legislative
disadvantage in the global shipping market. Foreign-flag operators are car ible
not only of carrying all of America's foreign (and domestic) trade, but also of
constructing and repairing any U. S.-owned or operated vessel at considerably
less expense.
The economic consequences of overreliance on foreign-flag operators are
staggering. Because the United States is heavily dependent on imported raw
materials, the flow of imports can be disrupted by boycotts, embargoes, and wars
[Ref. 19:p. 4-3]. On the one hand, cargo freight rates could be manipulated (or
held hostage) by foreign-flag operators. On the other hand, foreign operators
seaborne trade is said to serve that commerce."
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simply could refuse to transship goods to and from the United States. In either
case, America's economic well-being would be in jeopardy-vulnerable to the
whims or the legitimate priorities of foreign shipping companies and their
governments.
This transportation phenomena is neither new nor unique: at the
commencement of World War I, foreign-flag vessels--normally available to ship
America's foreign commerce during peacetime--discontinued commercial service
and returned home to serve their countries' wartime needs. As nations withdrew
their commercial fleets from essential trade routes, and with virtually no U. S.
Merchant Marine to fill the demand for seaborne transportation, America was
incapable of providing for its economic well-being or satisfying its military
requirelrents. As a result, freight rates for domestic goods destined for Europe
and elsewhere skyrocketed [Ref. 3:p. 141.
Even if these scenarios could be dismissed as irrelevant, the ability to ship
America's foreign-bound commerce is only one reason to maintain a U. S.
Merchant Marine and shipbuilding infrastructure. As demonstrated throughout
history, the U. S. Merchant Marine has been called on to deliver troops and
supplies in times of crisis. Among the conclusions discussed in the National
Transportation Policy (NTP) was one that stressed the importance of the civilian
transportation system to "support military sealift" [Ref. 10:p. vii]. Although
America's "fourth arm of defense" has atrophied on the commercial side, a potent
sealift capability remains.
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A. SEALIFT - AN ENDURING MISSION
Although the National Military Strategy of the United States (1992) classifies
transportation as a "supporting capability," it stresses the importance of
prepositioning in achieving strategic mobility [Ref. 20:p. 24]. Only through
adequate sealift can the United States maintain the military capability to respond
quickly and decisively to regional crises, while simultaneously executing a global
strategy based on 2redible forward presence. The importance of transportation
in general, and strategic sealift in particular, is articulated again in the Navy and
Marine Corps White Paper "... From the Sea:"
... Sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy. Our nation must remain capable
of delivering heavy equipment and resupplying major ground and air
combat power forward in crisis. Sealift is the key to force sustainment for
joint operations and we are committed to a strong national sealift capability.
These recent proclamations from the civilian and military leadership are not
inconsistent with the policy objectives which have guided the U. S. Merchant
Marine since the enactment of the Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920:
... it is necessary for the national defense and the proper growth of its
foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels to ... serve
as a naval or military auxiliary ....
Merchant vessels perform a variety of roles during times of war or national
crisis. Based on exhaustive interviews with key "players" who would place
demands on the privately-owned merchant fleet, there are six major roles for
merchant ships. These six roles for the merchant marine include: strategic sealift;
mobile logistic support force (MLSF) augmentation; amphibious operations
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support; logistics over-the-shore (LOTS); other military applications (i.e. providing
an emergency UNREP capability or a ready deck for helo operations); and
support of the national economy. [Ref. 19:p. 3-1]'
Of these six roles, strategic sealift provides "immediate sealift capability in
support of ... contingency or general war plans." [Ref. 19 :p. 3-1] Additionally,
strategic sealift can be categorized according to task. Primary tasks include:
* Deployment and Resupply-Notwithstanding a "new world order,"
commercial merchant ships continue to support American forward presence
(and power projection) around the world;
"* Deployment Shortfalls--Merchant vessels may be called to cover cargo
requirements that are not satisfied by current contingency plans;
"* Critical "Point-to-Point" Movements-Ships can move military cargo that is
needed urgently in a forward operating area;
"* Floating Storage-Commercial vessels can be used to offset the shortage of
POL tankers in the theater of operations;
"* Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Relocation-The merchant marine can
move contingency stocks of POL into the affected theater of operations; and
"* Surge Force-Programs such as MPS, APS, and FSS provide a quick reaction
sealift capability that can transport military equipment to any theater. [Ref.
19:p. 3-1 and 3-2]
42 In fact, there is a hierarchy of missions for the U. S.
Merchant Marine in times of war or national emergency. At the
pinnacle of this hierarchy is service as a Military Auxiliary.
Missions such as Defense Resupply, Security, and Commerce (in
descending order of importance) are performed as well. For a
thorough analysis of roles and missions, see M. Rosenblatt and Son,
Inc., The National Defense Relevance of the World's Dry CarQo
Contract Fleet, U. S. Department of Commerce National Technical
Information Service, Washington, D.C., June, 1982, pp. 3-1 through
3-4.
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B. MILITARY SEALIFT ASSETS
Historically, ships have carried approximately ninety-five percent of all
military cargo (and nearly ninety-nine percent of fuel) to the theater of operations.
One should consider, though, that in a major (or lesser) regional contingency, the
same U. S.-flag merchant marine that would support military operations would
likewise be unable to carry either the raw materials or finished goods needed to
maintain the economy. Clearly, opportunity costs to the nation vary directly in
relation to the scope and duration of the conflict: protracted contingencies
demand dedicated shipping assets for relatively long periods of time; conversely,
lesser regional contingencies (LRCs) of shorter duration demand fewer shipping
assets.
Having considered the zero-sum association between military and economic
opportunity costs, the question becomes: which types of ships are "best equipped"
and "most suitable" to contribute to the war effort? But before discussing military
sealift programs and assets, it is important to remember that not every American-
flag merchant ship is suitable for use as a naval auxiliary. On the contrary, there
is a difference between the types of vessels which are commercially viable
(economically efficient) and those that have military utility.
Although there are exceptions, militarily useful vessels tend to be smaller
(colloquially labeled "handy-size"), faster, self-sustaining, and flexible. These
types of vessels are able not only to enter shallow channels and harbors, but also
possess the capability to accommodate a variety of cargo in their holds and tanks.
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Also, these vessels would be capable of loading and discharging their cargo
without having to rely on specialized gantry cranes or other port equipment for
assistance. In general, LASH and SeeBee ships, breakbulk and RO/RO vessels,
and multi-purpose tankers have demonstrated greater utility as military
auxiliaries than either specialized container ships or product tankers [Ref. 19:pp.
1-1, 1-21.33
Although the U. S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has overall
responsibility for providing adequate sealift (and airlift) to the unified (theater)
Commanders, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) is tasked with the day-to-day
management of naval sealift and logistic assets [Ref. 21:pp. 42-43]." In order to
meet the sealift requirements during wartime, the MSC relies on a variety of
government- and privately-owned sources. In peacetime, a nucleus fleet of MSC-
owned vessels plies the oceans in support of forward presence operations. When
the determination is made that additional sealift capacity is needed-beyond that
43 In addition to structural and operational characteristics,
Operations Desert Shield and Storm highlighted the importance of
the type (i.e., steam or diesel) of propulsion system in
determining the defense utility of a vessel. Other considerations
include a vessel's lifting capability and breadth (beam). For a
description of National Defense Features (NDFs) , see: M. Rosenblatt
and Son, Inc., The National Defense Relevance of the World's Dry
Cargo Corntract Fleet, U. S. Department of Commerce National
Technical Information Service, Washington, D.C., June, 1982, pp. 5-
6 through 5-10.
4' Under the aegis of the Defense Transportation System (DTS),
the MSC and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) work
jointly to fulfill the sealift requirements during routine
operations and periodic exercises.
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which is owned or controlled by the MSC-vessels are chartered, activated, or
requisitioned (as appropriate) in sequential order by the MSC (and with the
assistance of the MARAD) to satisfy the increased demand.
Next in this progression are the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), as well as the
Maritime Prepositioning and Afloat Prepositioning Ships (MPS and APS
respectively). Once these assets are committed to the sealift effort, the MSC will
then turn to commercial charters (leasing) to fill the sealift void. First, the MSC
will turn to U. S.-flag shipping companies to carry military cargo; if American-flag
carriers are unwilling or unable to cover the cargo commitments, then the MSC
will contract foreign-flag companies to ship the equipment. Once the pool of
commercial ship charters is exhausted, or if additional sealift resources are needed
to meet immediate requirements, then the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) will be
activated.45 Having activated this category of vessels, the MSC may take
operational control of American-flag ships participating in the Sealift Readiness
Program (SRP). Finally, given the demand for increased lift capability (beyond
the capability already provided), the MSC could requisition ay American-flag
vessel, request assets from NATO countries, or activate non-RRF ships for military
duty.* [Ref. 21:p. 49]
45 Because of their age, slow speed, relatively long
Sading/unloading times, poor material condition, and a presumed
lack of time for activation, non-RRF vessels in the NDRF are among
the last to be activated.
"46 The normal sequence of resource utilization is prescribed
in MARAD OPLAN 001A, Basic War Plan, Section 501, September, 1991.
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1. MSC-Controlled Fleet
In FY-1972, the Navy reluctantly initiated a plan to turn over a number
of underway replenishment vessels to the MSC. From the U. S. Navy's point of
view, transferring UNREP responsibility from active naval replenishment forces
to an MSC-controlled fleet was a trade off between fiscal savings and combat
readiness [Ref. 3:p. 41]. From its inception, this government-operated and owned
fleet has been manned by civilian mariners and augmented by naval
communications (signal) detachments. Today, the MSC controls a variety of
sealift-oriented vessels. This fleet of MSC ships is comprised of combat stores
vessels (T-AF/AFS), gasoline tankers (T-AOG), fleet oilers (T-AO), and multi-
purpose cargo ships (T-AK/AKR).
2. Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Over a decade has passed since the Maritime Prepositioning Ship
(MPS) program was established. Although the idea of marrying up troops to
prepositioned equipment is neither new nor revolutionary, the fact that such a
substantial enabling force is carried aboard government-operated merchant vessels
is indicative of the Navy's commitment to a national defense strategy based on
the foundations of Forward Presence and Crisis Response [Ref. 20: p. 6]. Over the
last fifteen years, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) concept has evolved
from an initial response capability to a fully-integrated, and rapidly deployable
sealift asset. The forerunner of the MPS program--the Near Term Prepositioning
Force (NTPS)-was established in 1980 in response to a Department of Defense
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strategic mobility enhancement initiative [Ref. 22:p. E-15]. The NTPF not only
provided a stop-gap sealift capability, but filled the prepositioning void in
Southwest Asia (SWA) and the Far East.
But something other than an interim capability was needed to improve
response times for SWA contingencies. By early 1985, the first combination break-
bulk and RO/RO vessels specifically built or converted for the U. S. Navy were
loaded with vehicles, equipment, and supplies. By 1987, thirteen ships were
obtained by the Navy and organized into three independent squadrons. Crewed
with civilian mariners, each MPS squadron carries enough equipment and
supplies to sustain one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for at least thirty
days.47
3. Afloat Prepositioning Ships
Maritime prepositioning of supplies was also embraced by the U. S.
Army during the early 1980s. And like the Navy, the Army wanted to improve
its initial response times for SWA contingencies [Ref. 22:p. E-14]. The Army's
solution: to strategically preposition ships in the Indian Ocean. Not only does the
Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) carry war reserve cargo (and fuel) for the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, but each ship can be employed as a "floating
warehouse" in the event of regional conflict. Currently, the APF consists of
47 Each MPS squadron is associated with a specific MEB to
assure effective planning, training, and execution. MPS Squadron
1 (MPS-1) deploys from the Atlantic Ocean; MPS-2 is anchored at
Diego Garcia; and MPS-3 is home ported at Guam/Saipan.
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twelve Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS): eight dry cargo vessels and four
tankers.
4. Fast Sealift Ships
Originally constructed as fast merchant ships capable of attaining
speeds of thirty-three knots, eight SL-7 Class ships were acquired from the
Sealand Corporation in 1981. Due to their high speed and correspondingly high
fuel consumption rates, these ships proved to be uneconomical for commercial
use. On the other hand, their size (cargo carrying capacity), speed, and flexibility
were ideal fot employment as naval auxiliaries. Designated by the MSC as Fast
Sealift Ships (FSS), they are docked at ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts
and remain on a 96-hour tether for activation [Ref. 23]. With an additional
twenty-four hours, these vessels can be loaded with the all equipment for an
entire Mechanized Infantry Division [Ref. 22:p. E-13].
5. National Defense Reserve Fleet
The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 created a government-owned and
administered National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of inactive-but potentially
useful-merchant ships. The mission of this Reserve Fleet was to provide a
"surge" capability to meet the shipping demands during wartime. In 1976, this
Reserve Fleet was divided into two components: a Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
that consisted of vessels maintained in varying degrees of readiness; and a non-
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TABLE 4.1 NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET, 1945 - 1992
Fiscal Year Ships Fiscal Year Ships
1945 5 1969 1,017
1946 1,421 1970 1,027
1947 1,204 1971 860
1948 1,675 1972 673
1949 1,934 1973 541
1950 2,277 1974 487
1951 1,767 1975 419
1952 1,853 1976 348
1953 1,932 1977 333
1954 2,067 1978 306
1955 2,068 1979 317
1956 2,061 1980 303
1957 1,889 1981 317
1958 2,074 1982 303
1959 2,060 1983 304
1960 2,000 1984 386
1961 1,923 1985 300
1962 1,862 1986 299
1963 1,819 1987 326
1964 1,739 1988 320
1965 1,594 1989 312
1966 1,327 1990 329
1967 1,152 1991 316
1968 1,062 1992 306'
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD '92, The Annual
Report of the Maritime Administration, May, 1993.
' Includes 76 vessels not owned by the Maritime Administration, but in the
custody of the MARAD.
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RRF component [Ref. 24:p. 81. Table 4.1 provides the inventory of the NDRF from
1945 to 1992.
a. The Ready Reserve Force
The vessels of the RRF are the first line of ships in reserve. Laid
up at Reserve Fleet sites on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts, RRF ships are
maintained so that they can be activated in 5, 10, or 20 days at predesignated
shipyards or port facilities in the event of war. Table 4.2 provides a breakdown
of the RRF according to ship type. Although the majority are breakbulk (dry
cargo) type vessels, MARAD does control a number of RO/RO vessels and
tankers in the RRF.I
b. Non-RRF Ships
Of the 306 ships which comprise the NDRF, 210 are categorized as
non-RRF ships. 9 These vessels are maintained in poor material condition and,
according to MARAD, would need from 30 to 120 days to activate [Ref. 24 :p. 9].
Often referred to as the "Ghost Fleet," the non-RRF ships receive very little
exterior preservation and maintenance. With the exception of two Victory ships
"4 Of the 96 vessels of the RRF, 20 are located in James River,
Virginia, 12 in Beaumont, Texas, and 15 Suisun Bay, California.
The remaining ships are assigned to other locations in CONUS and
Japan. (Some of the higher priority vessels are maintained in a
reduced operating status which permits activation within four days.
This status is referred to as ROS-4).
49 The 210 non-RRF ships include 71 "Victory" Class dry cargo
ships from World War II. Additionally, there are 76 vessels not
owned by the MARAD but in MARAD custody.
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TABLE 4.2 BREAKDOWN OF THE READY
RESERVE FORCE (RRF)









Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office [Ref. 24:
p.9].
1 This does not include the recent purchase of twelve
RO/ROs by the MARAD for conversion and acceptance
into the RRF.
test-activated in 1985, none of the non-RRF ships has been activated since the
Vietnam War. Despite their age and material condition, these vessels retain some
utility as military or naval auxiliaries since most are self-sustaining breakbulk-
type ships.
C. OTHER SEALIFT* ASSETS
In addition to the aforementioned programs, current sealift contingency
plans rely on statutory and presidential authority to regulate and direct the use
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of marine vessels in the event of war or national emergency [Ref. 25:p. 19].s'
Legislative and executive powers notwithstanding, the Department of Defense
depends on privately-owned, U. S.-flag shipping companies to contribute and
perform voluntarily in a crisis.
1. Foreign Charters'
Under the Armed Services Procurement Act, the Department of the
Navy (DoN) has the statutory authority to contract vessels for lease or acquisition
of services. These government contracts may be negotiated directly with U. S. or
foreign shipping companies or "advertised" [Ref. 25:p. 201. Although formal
advertising is established as DoD policy for all ship lease and purchase contracts,
direct negotiations are authorized in three circumstances where: it is determined
that such negotiation is necessary in the public interest during a national
emergency "declared by Congress or the President;" the nature of the crisis does
not allow enough time for advertising; and the nature of the property [ship]
makes it impractical to let the contract through advertised competitive bidding.
[Ref. 25:p. 20] 12 Many of the assets available to the MSC for inter-theater and
50 Direct intervention by the government to secure additional
U. S.-flag vessels would occur only to the extent necessary to
compensate for inadequate sealift assets during times of war or
national crisis.
51 Technically, the MSC-controlled fleet is composed of MSC-
owned vessels and those commercial ships under long- or short-term
charters.
52 Time, voyage, and bareboat represent the general types of
maritime charters.
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intra-theater deployment (including the FSS and the MPS squadrons) are leased
from American and foreign-flag shipping companies.
2. Sealift Readiness Program
Although the movement of military cargo accounts for only a small
percentage of total industry revenue, the privately-owned U. S. Merchant Marine
has carried the majority of DoD cargo since World War II. In spite of this
support, a continuing problem for the DoD is how to augment MSC-controlled
shipping with additional American-flag vessels should the need arise (in a
nonmobilization scenario).,3 To ensure suf-,cient cargo space in U. S. bottoms,
the DoD instituted the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). In fact, by the early
1970s, participation by American shipping companies in the MSC-sponsored SRP
was required for competitive bidding on DoD cargo. [Ref. 3:p. 47]
Although an involuntary call-up of SRP-committed ships has not
occurred, the concept of a Sealift Readiness Program remains viable. The Sealift
Readiness Program-a contractual program--requires that U. S. shipping
companies that bid on MSC contracts obligate fifty percent of their cargo capacity
to the program.5' Half of that cargo capacity must be made available within
thirty days of notification; the remainder of the space must be available to the
53 Because the DoD is constrained from requisitioning
privately-owned ships except in the case of a mobilization declared
by the President, any arrangement for employing U. S.-f lag merchant
vessels must be entered into voluntarily by the shipping company.
"5 Strictly speaking, a shipping company must agree to contractfifty percent of its American-flag fleet to the SRP.
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MSC within sixty days. Further, those ships built with CDS funds (or receiving
ODS funds) are committed to the SRP [Ref. 22:p. E-13].
3. Effective U. S. Control
Clearly, it is much more profitable for American shipowners to operate
their vessels under "flags of convenience" than to register them under the Stars
and Stripes. Although the majority of American owners of foreign-flag vessels
consider their fleets to be part of the American Merchant Marine, there is little
doubt that those who choose to operate their vessels under foreign-flag registry
do so because of the potential for higher returns on the (capital) investments. [Ref.
4:pp. 218-221]
Pursuant to Section 902(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as
amended in 1939, all vessels owned by American citizens (and corporations)--
including the ships of foreign registry-are subject to requisitioning by the
government in certain instances [Ref. 19:p. 2-18]. These American-owned, but
foreign registered ships are considered to be under effective U. S. control (EUSC).
Specifically, an American-owned vessel can be requisitioned for duty as a naval
auxiliary whenever the President proclaims that it is advisable to do so in the
intereots of national security, and during any national emergency declared by the
President [Ref. 25: p. 21].'s
55 A EUSC ship must meet at least one of the following
conditions: the ship must have over 50-percent ownership by U. S.
citizens (or corporations); the vessel must be covered by War Risk
insurance by the MARAD; or the ship is subject to control of the
MARAD as a precondition of transfer to foreign registry.
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V. SEALIFT AND THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE: AN ANALYSIS OF
PERSONNEL AND VESSEL AVAILABILITY DURING THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR
A. GAUGING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SEALIFT
By what quantitative standard should planners and commanders judge the
viability of strategic sealift in general, and the performance of the Merchant
Marine (as well as foreign-flag shipping companies) in particular? Simply, what
measure of effectiveness (MOE) should apply? For any major regional
contingency requiring sealift, and Operations Desert Shield and Storm are no
exception, the capability to deploy rapidly the maximum tonnage (and volume)
of military cargo to an area of responsibility (AOR) in response to (and in support
of) support of combat operations ashore is the bedrock upon which an
appropriate MOE is developed.'
Certainly, the ability to lift military cargo is impacted both directly and
indirectly by a myriad of variables, not the least of which are the number and type
of commercial and government vessels available for immediate (and near-term)
deployment from ports in the continental United States (CONUS), overseas ports,
and prepositioning anchorages. Indeed, the composition of the U. S.-flag
56 Corroborated by CAPT Jeffrey Flood, USN, Military Sealift
Command (N3), in an interview on 01 September 1993.
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merchant fleet weighs heavily on this capability: the fact that the American-flag
fleet shifted from breakbulk-type vessels to highly efficient container vessels has
diminished its ability to accommodate the "footprint" of specific types of rolling
stock. This, however, represents only one-half of the sealift equation. In addition
to comparing the tonnage and volume of military cargo transshipped to the war
zone against preplanned requirements and timelines and measuring sealift
readiness by matching activation schedules to actual vessel performance, one
must consider the quantity-and quality--of mariners which are required and
available to crew those specialized ships.
Some would question whether shipbuilding (or lack thereof) should be
included in the sealift assessment. To the extent that domestic shipbuilding has
cross-cutting implications for maritime employment (at sea and ashore) and
impacts directly on the number of seagoing vessels that are available for
contingency operations (CONOPS) in the unlikely event of a protracted (global)
conflict, shipbuilding and repair are integral to the economic and national security
posture of the United States. Indeed, for every job in an American shipyard,
another three are created [Ref. 13:p. 3]. The fact that "there will be only one or
two American yards left that can build big ships" by 1998 is sufficient cause for
concern by economic and defense planners alike [Ref. 13:p. 3].
However, as we shall see, the epoch of the "come as you are" (i.e., M=C=D)
war such as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm has obviated the requirement
for, and nullified the utility of, shipbuilding per se. It is precisely because there
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may be little (if any) tactical or strategic warning, coupled with predictions for
MRCs of limited scope and duration, that the concept of wartime-generated
shipbuilding to meet DoD mobility requirements has been reduced to an
anachronism in the post-Cold War security environment. As such, conflict-
induced ship construction is of limited utility in assessing sealift performance.
B. WARTIME COMPARISONS
The history and present state of the U. S. Merchant Marine has been
discussed in detail. This historical perspective was not merely a scholarly
exercise. War games arvd simulations notwithstanding, the only "datapoints" from
which to measure sealift successes and assess vulnerabilities are previous
mobilizations. Ideally, sealift policy--and requirements-should be driven not only
by a pragmatic assessment of the threat, but by a healthy respect for lessons
learned from past conflicts. Unfortunately, this was not always the case.
Confronted with the unprecedented military buildup by Germany and Japan in
the 1930s, civilian (and uniformed) leaders failed to learn from, or capitalize upon,
the sealift lessons and vulnerabilities of World War I.
In retrospect, the parallels are strikingly similar. In both instances, the lack
of a healthy and robust Merchant Marine prior to the outbreak of hostilities not
only impaired the ability of the United States to provide for its defense
requirements and economic well-being, but resulted in hastily formed (and rel-
atively inefficient) government-sponsored shipbuilding programs during each
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conflict to satisfy the massive demand for sealift assets. And in both cases, the
U. S. maritime industry was capable of accommodating the emergent vessel and
manpower requirements over time.
Although American-flag carriers enjoyed temporary economic windfalls
following the cessation of hostilities in 1918 and 1945 respectively, the outbreak
of the Korean War in June, 1950, again placed tremendous demands on the U. S.
Merchant Marine. However, unlike pre-World War I and II conditions, the
United States owned and controlled a sufficient number of merchant vessels to
satisfy the emergency demand without having to resort to conflict-induced
shipbuilding programs. The foremost lesson that must be relearned is that there
is no substitute for a dependable, American-flag merchant fleet-in-being.
Secondly, unlike the chaotic experience of training merchant mariners under full
mobilization conditions during World War II, those charged with activating
government-owned assets had ample time to match projected manpower require-
ments to anticipated vessel activation schedules. Because there existed a fleet-in-
being, there was no requirement to mass produce civilian mariners with
minimum skills to man newly-constructed ships. In fact, former merchant seamen
were recruited from shoreside positions to make up the difference between
peacetime and contingency manning as ships were recalled to active service from
the NDRF.
Historically, the U. S. Merchant Marine reflects a cyclical maritime industry
with peaks and valleys corresponding to wartime and peacetime needs,
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respectively. The period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars was no
exception. The Merchant Marine contracted in response to an economic recession
and the decline in global shipping. In many ways, the sealift response during the
Vietnam War paralleled that of the Korean conflict. By 1965, the Department of
Defense again activated the NDRF to augment American-flag merchant ships (as
well as MSTS-owned and chartered ships) in the delivery of military cargo to
Vietnam. And again, mariners were recruited from the union halls (or recalled
from semi-retirement) to fill the billets of an expanded fleet.
It is not beyond the realm of possibility that these latter two conflicts lulled
civilian leaders and military planners alike into a false sense of national (sealift)
security. Arguably, the logistic achievements during the Korean and Vietnam
campaigns may have masked inadvertently sealift vulnerabilities and shortfalls,
and contributed partially to a laissez-faire, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" attitude
in Washington. Indeed, the U. S. Merchant Marine may have been its own worst
enemy: if a residual fleet of World War 11-vintage NDRF vessels, combined with
government-owned and U. S.-flag commercial vessels and supplied by a labor
pool of active and semi-retired civilian mariners, was sufficient to meet the
logistic needs of both conflicts, then it is conceivable that sealift policy was
assessed (incorrectly) as appropriate to meet future requirements. Further, it must
be remembered that unlike the North Atlantic during World War HI, the maritime
environment during the Vietnam and Korean Wars was relatively benign. Absent
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from Vietnamese waters was any credible anti-shipping/ASUW threat to
American bottoms.
However, it is both idealistic and dangerous to assume that a well-
maintained fleet of merchant ships and a viable labor pool of mariners will be
available under any circumstances for immediate call-up during a national crisis.
A critical review of the Vietnam War logistics response reveals deep cracks in the
sealift facade. In fact, providing sufficient (qualified) seamen to man the
merchant ships was a major problem during the Vietnam build-up [Ref. 26:p.
491]. Not only was the pool of available seamen relatively small, but each ship
activated from the NDRF required a relatively large number of billets to be filled.
Consequently, the pace of sealift operations was influenced by manpower avail-
ability. In any event, shortages of both licensed and unlicensed mariners were
directly responsible for a number of ship-delayed (vice cargo-delayed) sailings
[Ref. 27:p. 1-6].
C. THE SWA SEALIFT RESPONSE
As with past mobilizations, the sine qua non of logistics operations during the
Persian Gulf War was the ability to move maximum tonnage and density of cargo
as rapidly as possible to the SWA theater. It is in this context that sealift
successes and vulnerabilities must be viewed. In many critical ways, the
movement of military equipment by sea during Operations Desert Shield and
Storm, and the supporting actions assumed by the Department of Defense, the
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Maritime Administration, American-flag shipping companies, and the labor
unions, correspond closely with actions taken by many of the same institutions
during the Vietnam conflict and, to a lesser extent, the Korean War.
Despite glaring-and important-similarities with previous mobilizations, one
is warned against making the Persian Gulf War either the conceptual or policy
model for future sealift operations in the post-Cold War environment, however.
Although it is true that certain aspects of the Persian Gulf sealift response
dovetail nicely with the Vietnam sealift effort, and are in fact instructive as
planning tools for the next conflict, placing too much emphasis on the conduct or
characteristics of this conflict does as much to distort and misrepresent the status
of the U. S. Merchant Marine as to ignore the geo-political circumstances and
dynamics in August, 1990. The best way to avoid this historical "trap" is to
appreciate not only the operational similarities of each sealift effort, but the
uniqueness of the conflict.
1. Vessel Availability
The marshalling of sealift assets from prepositioning and CONUS sites
heralded the largest buildup of U. S. forces since the Vietnam War. President
Bush's decision to deploy American forces to the Middle East on August 7, 1990,
had a profound and immediate effect on the maritime industry. The President's
decision to execute Operation Desert Shield initiated the deployment of two MPS
squadrons (MPS Squadrons -2 and -3), as well as the ten (available) Afloat
Prepositioning Ships from ports and anchorages in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
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to SWA [Ref. 28 :pp. 82-83]." In addition to these resources, Fast Sealift
Squadron One, partially crewed and maintained at CONUS layberths on 96-hour
(ROS-4) standby, were directed by the Commander, Military Sealift Command
(COMSC) to make ready for sea [Ref. 21: p. 44]. The U. S-flag sealift train had
been put into motion.
a. From No-Notice to Steel Bridge
It took only eight days from the time that the no-notice deployment
order was received for the first component of the APF (MPSRON-2) to begin
offloading heavy combat equipment at the port of Al Jabayl, Saudi Arabia." In
the interim, the Navy had shifted its focus to RRF deployment. On August 10,
the MSC requested the priority activation of all seventeen RO/RO vessels in the
RRF in order to cover surge- and sustainment-phase lift requirements. Shortly
thereafter on August 14, the first of the FSS (the USNS Capella) sailed "chock-a-
block" with heavy combat equipment belonging to the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) from the Port of Savannah. [Ref. 21:pp. 42-44]. Phase I sealift
operations had begun.'
57 One of the APS was in the Mediterranean Sea when the
deployment order was issued.
"58 The lack of an earlier decision to get the MPS underway not
only affected logistics timetables, but reduced the options
available to the CINC. See: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final
Report to Conqress, April, 1992, p. E-31.
"5 The sealift deployment and sustainment effort of Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm occurred in two phases. The first
sealift phase extended from August to November, and was designed to
deploy and sustain defensive forces to deter Iraqi aggression into
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In accordance with utilization plans (including MARAD OPLAN
001A), militarily-useful vessels were obtained from a variety of sources.' But
like most-if not all--war plans, the structured progression (hierarchy) through
which categories of ships (i.e. MSC-Charter, RRF, SRP, EUSC, or Allied) are called
into service quickly became convoluted as planning gave way to execution. As
might be expected, the needs of the theater CINC overwhelmed MSC-controlled
assets. As a case in point, the MSC was compelled to request the RO/ROs in the
RRF inventory on the day that it began chartering ships for the same purpose
[Ref. 29:p. 19].61
(1) Evaluation of Performance. By any measure, the sealift
performance during the first four months (Phase I) of Operation Desert Shield was
exceptional. In fact, more equipment had been deployed to Saudi Arabia within
the first three weeks of the mobilization than "in the first three months of the no-
notice deployment to the Korean War" [Ref. 21:p. 421. Not surprisingly, the post-
Saudi Arabia. The reader should not confuse these two logistics
Phases with the three basic sealift phases: prepositioning
("prepo"), surge, and sustainment.
60 MPSRON-I was not employed during Phase I sealift operations.
"61 Because there were so few RO/ROs in the U. S. Merchant
Marine, the MSC was forced to turn to foreign-flag charters. (MSC
entered into the first foreign-flag charter on 21 August).
However, in all cases where U. S.-flag vessels were available for
hire, and in accordance with MSC policy, American ships were given
preference over foreign-flag carriers. For a comprehensive
discussion of MSC-charter preference, see: U. S. Congress, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Persian Gulf Sealift Requirements,
USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 54.
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Desert Shield/Storm literature is replete with quantitative comparisons of past
mobilizations.'2 Among them is the testimony of VADM Paul D. Butcher, USN,
Deputy CINC, USTRANSCOM, before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine.
He testified before Congress that "We sealifted 123,000 tons on the first 12 ships
in Desert Shield, nearly 50 percent more than was sealifted to Korea in the first 30
days ... irrespective of circumstances" [Ref. 30: p. 131.
Despite the immense volume of military cargo moved quickly
to SWA, the sealift experience was, at best, a qualified success story. It is
precisely because those "circumstances" had such a profound influence on the
conduct of the mobilization that VADM Butcher may have been premature with
his assessment of the sealift effort. In all fairness, though, Operations Desert Shield
and Storm did validate the concept of afloat and ashore prepositioning (and hence
the wisdom of the DoD in spending $8.3 billion on the MPS, APS, FSS, and RRF
during the 1980s). Both in terms of total cargo capacity and their ability to
respond promptly to SWA, the performance of the APF and the FSS was
outstanding. Not only did each of the three MPS Squadrons meet (and in some
cases exceed) the expected 10-day timetable for unloading and marrying unit
62 By the commencement of Phase II operations, 1.2 million
short tons of cargo (and more than 3.5 million short tons of fuel)
had been shipped to SWA. Similar to past conflicts, sealift
delivered ninety-five percent of the cargo bound for SWA. Even by
CNA estimates, the pace of operations was one-third greater than
that achieved during the first twelve months of the Korean War.
See: Ronald Rost, John Adams and John Nelson, Sealift in Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 7 Auqust 1990 to 17 February 1991, The
Center for Naval Analyses, Report No. CRM 91-109, May, 1991, pp.
1-2.
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equipment to combat forces, but the APF was responsible for delivering
approximately one-half of the total ammunition needed during Phase I [Ref. 29:p.
35].
Other sealift successes also warrant mentioning. On August
23, the MSC entered into an agreement with American-flag carriers to transport
foodstuffs and supplies in regularly-scheduled liner vessels bound for Saudi ports.
By participating (voluntarily) in the Special Middle East Shipping Agreement
(SMESA), American-flag shipping companies were obligated to provide container
slots for government (vice commercial) cargo. In total, seventy-nine ships
representing five American-flag carriers (not including MSC) were contracted
through SMESA [Ref. 31].' According to data compiled after Desert Storm by
the MSC and MTMC (and referred to by APL and Sea-Land in company presenta-
tions), SMESA accounted for 28.8 percent of the total dry cargo tonnage delivered
to SWA.
In addition to SMESA, USTRANSCOM directed MTMC and
MSC to implement (and manage) the Desert Storm Sealift Express. Similar to air
delivery of high-value equipment and supplies, there was a requirement to
63 The following U. S.-flag companies participated in the
SMESA: Sea-Land Service, American President Lines, Farrell Lines,
Waterman Steamship Company, and Lykes Lines. (By MSC data, seven
U. S.-flag liner companies, totaling 114 ships, provided service
under SMESA). Although relatively little containerized military
cargo was delivered to SWA during Phase I, SMESA was invaluable for
transporting sustainment supplies to SWA. According to APL data,
these five carriers (including MSC) delivered 77,038 twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEUs) during Operations Desert Shield and Storm.
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transport containerized cargo to SWA as swiftly as possible. Sealift Express was
established solely to improve upon transit times for priority cargo to SWA."
Rather than shipping containers directly to Saudi Arabia, containers were
transshipped to feeder ships in the Mediterranean Sea. These "feeders" would
then shuttle the containers to SWA. Although planners envisioned a 23-day
transit from the final CONUS port of embarkation to the SWA port of
debarkatica, actual voyage times averaged between 25 and 27 days--still a
significant (virtually one week) reduction from previous non-SMESA crossings.
[Ref. 22:pp. F-36-37]
Nonetheless, the sealift effort was plagued by a variety of
ship-related factors. Chief among these factors was availability per se of U. S.-flag
carriers vis a vis foreign-flag operators. For mobilizations requiring sealift, it is
the policy of the MSC to turn first to the U. S. Merchant Marine for vessels.
Readily available ships would be chartered to carry surge and sustainment cargo.
If, for whatever reason, U. S.-flag ships are not available, then MSC will charter
foreign-flag vessels in order to get the cargo to the thealer as quickly as possible.
Although there was adequate sustainment phase lift through the use of container
ships owned and operated by U. S.-flag liner companies, American-flag surge
sealift-that capability which involved the immediate transportation of military
equipment (mainly from CONUS) to the theater Commander-was insufficient to
"64 Prior to establishing Sealift Express, it took between
thirty and thirty-five days to move containers to SWA.
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meet DoD requirements.' Faced with the immediate need to place ships--
regardless of nationality-on berth, COMSC was compelled to charter foreign-flag
breakbulk and RO/RO ships to accommodate unit equipment destined for
SWA." In fact, of the ships chartered by MSC during Desert Shield, forty-nine
vessels were of foreign registry [Ref. 2 1:p. 46]. Quantitatively, this category not
only represented twenty-eight percent of all ships utilized, but accounted for
fifteen percent of the total cargo delivered during Phase I.
This is not to suggest, however, that foreign-flag vessels
chartered for Desert Shield/Storm were either more reliable than their American-
flag competitors, or should be more heavily relied upon in future scenarios. To
the contrary, unlike their foreign counterparts, not one U. S.-flag vessel (in either
65 Sustainment phase shipping provides sustenance, long-term
foodstuffs, maintenance materials, and supplies to the troops. It
has been reported that U. S. -flag carriers were reluctant to remove
their vessels from liner service during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
for fear of losing commercial market share to foreign-flag
operators. Others attribute delays in vessel availability to
evolving sealift requirements/priorities and the lack of CENTCOM-
sponsored Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to guide
deployment operations. For related testimony, see: U. S. Congress,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Persian Gulf Sealift
Requirements, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1991. pp. 23, 28.
"66 In testimony before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine on
September 26, 1990, VADM Francis R. Donovan, Jr., USN, COMSC,
stated that "primary consideration is given to the ship's
availability to get on berth and deliver the cargo." Although ship
availability was of primary importance, MSC awarded all charters on
a competitive basis. Refer to: U. S. Congress, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Persian Gulf Sealift Reauirements. USGPO,
Washington, D.C., 1991.
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Phase) refused to enter the Persian (Arabian) Gulf or contiguous waters because
of crew or company-related interests. Unfortunately, on at least four occasions-
and arguably under the most favorable of politico-military circumstances-
foreign-flag vessels chartered to carry cargo into the Persian Gulf declined to
enter the combat zone.
In one incident, the master and crew of the M/V Trident Dusk
(Qatar registry) refused to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Contracted by
MSC, the vessel had onloaded cargo destined for SWA from the Port of Tacoma,
Washington, on 10 December. In response to this breach of contract, the MSC
placed the ship "off-hire" on 17 January 1991, and transshipped its freight to the
M/V Canadian Forest at Muscat, Oman.67 In another case, a foreign-flag ship
operated (chartered) by American President Lines (APL) refused to sail into the
Persian Gulf following the commencement of hostilities in January, 1991.
Contractual obligations notwithstanding, the crew of the feedership M/V Eagle
World (Panamanian registry) declined to get the ship underway for its weekly
"run" from the transshipment point at Al-Fujayrah, United Arab Emirates, to Ad-
Dammam, Saudi Arabia [Ref. 32:p.2].' Further, there were many instances
"67 The specifics of this case were provided by Mr. Keith A.
Bauer, Head, Special Projects Chartering Division, Military Sealift
Command, and Ms. Kathy Stangler in interviews on 02 September,
1993.
68 CAPT Grant Stewart, Assistant Marine Superintendent,
Operations/Engineering, American President Lines, Ltd., provided
the details of this case in an interview on 16 October, 1993.
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throughout Operations Desert Shield and Storm in which foreign-flag vessels could
meet neither the lay date for loading at CONUS ports, minimum speed
requirements, nor the safety and sanitary conditions as set forth in the MSC
contract.'9
Indeed, there was a mismatch between CENTCOM-driven
requirements and the sealift assets available to meet those needs during Phase I
operations. Not only did deliveries to Saudi Arabia lag behind CENTCOM
requirements, but by mid-September (C+40), CENTCOM had received less than
half of the unit equipment required by the Army's TPFDD [Ref. 30:p. 31170
Although CINCCENT was quoted in a Washington Post article (and by distressed
Members of Congress) as saying that the military (coalition) buildup was "running
five to six days behind schedule because of sealift problems," CENTCOM force
requirements were in fact "twelve days late in leaving and fourteen days late in
arriving" as of 18 September [Ref. 30: pp. 6, 261.
Foreign-flag charters notwithstanding, American-flag carriers
were not the only ones to be hounded by "on-berth" timetables and CENTCOM
requirements. The breakout and timely activation of RRF vessels following the
69 In reality, the propensity for a vessel to "strike" or
refuse sailing orders has less to do with the flag of registry than
the (mixed) nationalities of the crew assigned thereto.
`0 In retrospect, initial deployments took nearly ninety days
to close the forces defending Saudi Arabia [Ref. 30:p. 111.
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TABLE 5.1 PHASE I (SURGE) ACTIVATION OF THE RRF
Assigned Readiness Period
Activation Record 5 days 10 days 20 days Total
Early or on time 8 3 1 12
Late, 5 days or less 10 2 0 12
Late, 6 - 20 days 15 1 0 16
Late, more than 20 days 4 0 0 4
TOTAL 37 6 1 44
Source: Joint Department of Defense/Department of Transportation Ready
Reserve Force Working Group, The Ready Reserve Force: Enhancing a
National Asset, October, 1991, pp. 6-4.
deployment order pushed MARAD, the General Agents and Ship Managers
responsible for activation of particular vessels within the RRF, shipyards, and the
maritime labor unions to the limit. Although RRF ships delivered more than one-
third of the equipment to SWA during Phase I, most RRF ships were not
activated on schedule. Not only did RRF activations take twice as long as
expected, but many RRF vessels were required to sail relatively long distances to
load their cargoes [Ref. 29:pp. vi, 331. As illustrated in Table 5.1, only twenty-
seven percent of the ships activated achieved their assigned readiness timetable
and were tendered to MSC on time or early. Additionally, of the thirty-two RRF
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ships tendered late to the U. S. Navy, forty-five percent (20 of 44) missed their
preassigned readiness period by more than five days.'
A variety of mechanical difficulties and materiel problems
plagued shipyard workers, Port Engineers, and newly-formed crews. In addition
to non-machinery related problems such as diversions for bunkering and long
transit times to sea trial areas, vessels activated for Desert Shield experienced
steam-related engineering casualties including boiler tube leaks, evaporator
failures, and throttle (and other control valve) malfunctions. Numerous other
casualties associated with bilge/ballast system wastage, as well as fuel and lube
oil contamination, occurred with stunning regularity.72
Although mechanical failures related to primary shipboard
systems contributed to vessel delays in at least twenty-four (of the thirty-two)
cases, difficulties in activating the RRF can be traced directly to reductions in
prior year funding for scheduled maintenance and periodic RRF activation
exercises [Ref. 22 :p. E-11]. 3 Indeed, of the forty-four RRF vessels activated by
MARAD to meet surge requirements, only seventy-five percent (33 of 44) were
"7I Vessels with breakout schedules of five and ten days took,
on average, eleven and sixteen days respectively to activate from
layup. See: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
Congress, April, 1992, pp. E-10, F-34-35.
72 Despite the requirement to keep a complete set of drawings
for each RRF vessel, the electrical systems on at least one ship
had to be traced by hand since technical schematics were not
available.
3 MARAD was unable to "test" activate any RRF vessel in FY
1988, 1989, or 1990 due to funding limitations.
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in readiness condition (C-status) C-1 or C-2 at the time of breakout.74 The
remaining eleven vessels activated (twenty-five percent of the ships) had
individual readiness conditions of C-3 and below as of 01 August that precluded
them from meeting their assigned readiness timetables [Ref. 33:p. 6-3].
Unfortunately, persistent delays in the activation of RRF
vessels, coupled with U. S.-flag operators hesitant to surrender market share in
commercial (liner) service to foreign operators, not only had a deleterious effect
on logistics operations during Phase I, but resulted in the employment of foreign-
flag ships to cover the surge requirements. In the words of VADM Donovan, "We
went to the marketplace and got capability" [Ref. 30:p. 23]. As discussed, MSC
operated under the assumption that if a ship were readily available to move cargo
(with preference given to U. S.-flag carriers if available), then that vessel would
be chartered. Clearly, repeated delays in activating RRF ships exasperated the
vessel availability problem. But by depending on both American- and foreign-
flag charters, the Navy "... did not have to wait for the process of an RRF
breakout" to ferry priority unit equipment to SWA [Ref. 30: p. 55].
b. Phase II Sealift
The Presidential directive of 07 November that authorized offensive
deployments heralded the commencement of Phase II operations. Before
"•' Readiness conditions are expressed in terms of a ship's "C-
status." RRF ships in C-3 status have "major deficiencies not
repairable within the assigned readiness period. " Vessels in lower
readiness categories require even more time (and effort) to make
them available as surge or sustainment assets.
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evaluating the performance of sealift during this Phase, one must recognize that
Phase 11 conditions were profoundly different from Phase I. First, unlike the "no-
notice" activation and deployment of government-owned and operated ships (and
commercial charters), mobilization procedures and logistics systems were
operational. Not only were sealift planners able to position shipping assets for
Phase 11 operations, but transportation-feasible deployment plans were developed
(and evaluated) in advance of hostilities. Further, with the majority of
government assets (MPS, APS, FSS, and the RRF) already dedicated to the SWA
campaign and over fifty commercial vessels under charter to MSC, the domestic
maritime infrastructure was able to accommodate and flex to shifting priorities
and requirements.
Secondly, Phase II operations required that more service support
equipment be moved faster to SWA. Although fewer combat units were shipped,
CENTCOM requirements for combat support and combat service support
elements (primarily Army ground units) were greater than in Phase I operations.
Lastly, the fact that much of the service and support equipment was shipped from
Army coffers in Europe-as opposed to CONUS depots-not only resulted in
shorter transit distances and times to SWA, but reduced the shipping capability
needed to move that cargo.
(1) Evaluation of Performance. Both the pace of sealift operations
and the total volume of cargo moved by government assets and commercial
(including SMESA) vessels were greater than experienced in Phase I. Although
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estimates of the amount of equipment to be shipped more than triled between
mid-October and mid-November, sealift deliveries during Phase II were measured
as forty percent larger than the volume shipped during Phase I [Ref. 29:pp. 39-
40].75
In the early stages of Phase II, seaborne deliveries of unit
equipment actually surpassed CENTCOM requirements. Unfortunately, this
logistics phenomena was short-lived; by (and throughout) December, the lag
between requirements and sealift deliveries was nearly seven days, and by
January, deliveries lagged requirements in particular categories of equipment,
supplies, and materials by "up to a month." In fact, the flow of personnel from
CONUS (and Europe) led the arrival of unit equipment by one to three weeks.
Quite simply, unit integrity was sacrificed in order to maximize the use of scarce
(sealift) resources. [Ref. 29:pp. 41, 501
As in Phase I, the lack of shipping was responsible for the
mismatch between deliveries and requirements. But unlike Phase I operations,
sealift planners turned to commercial charters rather than government-owned or
operated assets to carry the predominant share of the sustainment cargo.
Arguably, the ships chartered by MSC were less desirable than those acquired
during Phase I. Not only was the proportion of RO/ROs to general cargo (or
container) vessels lower, but the cargo carrying capacity of those hired by MSC
75 It is estimated that between 29 and 30 million square feet
of cargo was delivered during both Phases, of which 17 million
(approximately sixty percent) was shipped during Phase II.
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TABLE 5.2 PHASE nI (SUSTAINMENT) ACTIVATION OF THE
RRF
Assigned Readiness Period
Activation Record 5 days 10 days 20 days Total
Early or on time 3 2 1 6
Late, 5 days or less 6 1 0 7
Late, 6-20 days 4 1 0 5
Late, more than 20 days 5 4 0 9
TOTAL 18 8 1 27
Source: Joint Department of Defense/Department of Transportation Ready
Reserve Force Working Group, The Ready Reserve Force: Enhancing a
National Asset, October, 1991, pp. 6-5.
fell short of that needed to maintain unit integrity. Also, the proportion of
American- to foreign-flag merchant vessels was similarly skewed. Of the 128
commercial vessels chartered by MSC during Phase II, 116 (ninety-one percent)
were of foreign registry. [Ref. 29: p. 43]7'
Although chartered vessels carried the major share of the
cargo, government assets continued to play an important role in the sealift effort.
In addition to those APF squadrons employed during Phase I, the third squadron
of MPS (MPSRON-1), associated with the 6th MEB, was deployed to SWA. These
vessels, stationed in the Western Atlantic (CONUS), reached the Arabian Gulf at
the time when the first chartered ship from Europe arrived in theater [Ref. 30: p.
76 MSC-chartered ships accounted for more than half of the
total cargo delivered during Phase II.
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44]. Also, another three RRF vessels were activated by MARAD in mid-
November following the President's decision on 08 November to authorize
offensive deployments. However, it was not until early December that additional
RRF vessels were obtained en masse to support the Phase II build-up. On 04
December, fourteen breakbulk ships were activated from the RRF to carry
ammunition to Saudi Arabia. From late-December through February, 1991, ten
additional RRF ships were activated by MARAD and made available to MSC [Ref.
29:pp. 20, 431.
As was the case with the RRF ships activated in response to
Phase I (surge) requirements, those activated during Phase II experienced their
share of delays. Of the twenty-seven RRF vessels mobilized, only twenty-one
(seventy-eight percent) were in readiness condition C-1 or C-2. In fact, the
remaining six ships were in readiness status C-5 when the call came to activate.'
Table 5.2 shows that only six (twenty-two percent) of the vessels activated by
MARAD (through the General Agents and Ship Managers) met their assigned
readiness timetable, while two-thirds of the ships tendered late missed their
assigned readiness period by more than five days. [Ref. 33:pp. 6-4, 6-5] 8
•' Readiness condition C-5 denotes "scheduled major repairs in
progress: unable to meet assigned readiness criteria."
"78 It would be unfair (and inaccurate) to place the burden of
responsibility for these delays on any one individual or
organization. On the contrary, General Agents (and Ship Managers),
shipyard workers, and MARAD representatives labored around-the-
clock to meet the deadlines. Although no level of funding can
guarantee 100 percent reliability, the absence of dedicated funds
for periodic maintenance and test activations impairs the ability
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c. Assessment
In no way should the materiel and mechanical problems associated
with the RRF detract from the overall success of the sealift effort during Desert
Shield/Storm. The fact that the USNS Antares, one of eight FSS normally
maintained in a high state of materiel readiness and capable of deploying within
four days (ROS-4), was towed to Spain following an engineering casualty off the
East coast of the United States shows that even under the best of conditions,
ships--including well-maintained ships-will experience mechanical failures.
Giving due consideration to the geo-political climate and military
environment following the invasion of Kuwait, sufficient sealift was available
in this particular case to move millions of tons of prepositioned, surge, and
sustainment equipment, supplies and fuel from bases in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, Europe, and CONUS to SWA. Indeed, this was a global effort, both in
terms of distance to the theater and the nations from which sealift assets were
acquired. For the record, though, that support did not come cheaply to the U. S.
government. Aside from assuming a degree of risk by relying heavily--in the
absence of American-flag assets--on foreign-flag shipping, those contracts awarded
by MSC reflected commercial ocean freight rates.
Nonetheless, strategic sealift was available throughout the SWA
campaign, and additional American-flag assets (government- and privately-
of those responsible to activate the RRF quickly and efficiently.
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owned) could have been obtained if necessary. In fact, it is estimated that only
forty percent of American-flag shipping (including charters and SMESA) was
employed in transportLag cargo to SWA [Ref. 29:p. 131. Also, only eighty-two
percent of the RRF was activated during this MRC. A number of measures-
admittedly, some severe-could have been implemented by the DoD via MARAD
to increase the supply of shipping (particularly in the early stages of the conflict).
Indeed, uniformed leaders in DoD, in consultation with MARAD, made a
conscious decision not to include certain programs in the sealift call-up. The
DoD, through USTRANSCOM and MSC, worked under self-imposed constraints
regarding the utilization of U. S. shipping in order to preserve the status quo in
the international shipping market.
Certainly, the abundance of foreign-flag charters (especially
RO/ROs) was a key factor in the decision not to disrupt U. S.-flag shipping
interests. If required, the U. S. government could have called on those ships
participating in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) or the Voluntary Tanker
Agreement (VTA) to provide supplementary cargo capacity. Additionally, the
government could have requisitioned ships under Effective U. S. Control (EUSC)
to augment the sealift effort. However, none of these measures were
implemented. Even those foreign-flag ships chartered by MSC were not part of
a greater political decision or formal request by the Bush Administration (or other
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coalition nation) to mobilize NATO-controlled shipping assets as prescribed by
Section 501 of MARAD OPLAN 001A (Basic War Plan)."
2. Personnel Availability
Operations Desert Shield and Storm created an intensive, albeit
temporary, demand on the available pool of maritime labor. Unlike the formal
readiness conditions and activation timetables associated with vessels per se, there
is no clear-cut guidance-from any agency or bureau--for ensuring that a sufficient
number of U. S. mariners will be available to crew those ships in event of a
national emergency. Although the President has the responsibility and authority
to requisition any American-flag merchant vessel to cover shipping commitments
during wartime, neither the Congress nor the Commander-in-Chief can force
civilians to sail. Whether a QMED, FWT, AB, or Third Officer, those who
participate in the business of shipping do so voluntarily--and without the benefit
of reemployment rights or exchange privileges.~"
79 Not only could MARAD have activated the balance of the
older, steam-powered, break-bulk ships in the RRF, but vessels from
the non-RRF fleet may have been candidates for "upgrading" to the
RRF (and subsequent activation).
"80 Although there are a few exceptions, licensed and unlicensed
mariners are regarded as "volunteers" -- even if engaged in
transporting military cargo into a war zone. Because of this
status, the UCMJ does not apply to merchant marine officers or
seamen. That is not to suggest, though, that a mariner who
violates a specific code of conduct will escape retribution. On
the contrary, the Master of the ship has the authority and the
responsibility to discipline or relieve a seaman who is either
negligent or deficient in his assigned duties. Further, the
transgression will be brought to the attention of the U. S. Coast
Guard for federal adjudication. Depending on the nature and
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a. Manning the Rails
In some important ways, the sealift buildup during Operations
Desert Shield and Storm reflected the juxtaposition of a best and worst case
manning scenario. And like ship availability, the circumstances surrounding (and
influencing) the call for mariners warrants examination. As discussed in Chapter
Ill, the pool of qualified, actively sailing U. S. mariners from which to draw on
during a conflict continues to fall precipitously. This decline parallels the
shrinking job base as the number of U. S.-flag vessels (as well as average crew
size) continues to plummet. The fact that the labor pool-approximately 24,000
mariners-was sufficient to crew the MPS, APS, FSS, MSC-owned and remaining
U. S.-flag commercial ships in 1990 does not diminish the seriousness (or the
immediacy) of the manning problem. On the contrary, the no-notice demand for
sealift assets, coupled with the wholesale activation of RRF ships, seriously
stressed the maritime unions' ability to provide qualified crews to those
government-operated vessels. Then-Secretary of Transportation Samuel K.
Skinner, remarked that "putting less than half of the emergency fleet (RRF) in
service has nearly exhausted the nation's supply of merchant mariners" [Ref. 34:
p. 3].
severity of the infraction, the seaman's qualifications can be
temporarily suspended or revoked permanently--in effect, stripping
the seaman of his ability to make a living in the industry. By any
standard, the ability to fire or fine a mariner is a significant
(and usually effective) deterrent.
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In total, 2,700 licensed and unlicensed mariners were found to crew
the seventy-eight RRF vessels. However, the RRF manning problem has its
origins in pre-Desert Shield planning assumptions and the size of the commercial
merchant fleet. Chief among these factors is the relationship between the civilian
labor force and the number of ships in the RRF than can be manned through
existing bureaucratic (union) mechanisms. As the size of the maritime labor force
decreases-paralleling the decrease in the numbers of U. S.-flag vessels-the
number ot RRF ships that can be crewed by commercial means will decline
similarly over time. Additionally, manpower planning (billet to mariner) ratios
were based on prior sealift mobilizations (World War II, Korea, and Vietnam).
Quite simply, sealift planning assumptions were invalid: no longer can the U. S.
Merchant Marine accommodate surge shipping requirements as it did in previous
mobilizations; nor can planners depend on relatively long "ramp-up" times to
generate an adequate supply of seamen. Taken together, pre-Persian Gulf War
manpower estimates predicted that some 9,000 mariners would be readily
available to crew the RRF. In reality, however, "extraordinary measures" were
implemented just to obtain the 2,700 needed to man eighty percent of the RRF!
[Ref. 351
The old adage that "the war won't wait until Monday morning"
rang loud and true in the halls of MARAD as the request for all seventeen
RO/ROs in the RRF came from the Pentagon on Friday evening, 10 August. Not
only was MARAD "faced with a 5:30 deadline on a Friday night" to set in motion
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the activation process, but the labor unions were forced to recall seamen over the
weekend to crew those RRF vessels [Ref. 30:p. 60]. The post-Desert Shield record
clearly shows that rapid and efficient manning of the RRF was hampered by a
number of situational factors, not the least of which was weekend activations.
Unfortunately, the task of mariner notification was made even more difficult by
the fact that the emergency call-up occurred during August--a traditional vacation
month for U. S. mariners [Ref. 10:p. 54].
(1) Steamships, Boomships, and Ancient Mariners. Although the
poor materiel condition of the RRF can be attributed to a lack of adequate
maintenance and periodic test activations, the delays in activating the RRF were
caused in part by the time needed to locate (qualified) seamen to crew the
government ships. Although no U. S.-flag ship mobilized during either Phase of
the sealift effort failed to sail because U. S. Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection
(COI) minimum manning requirements (as opposed to contract manning levels)
were not met, there were instances in both Phases where the absence of key crew
members was responsible for delayed light-offs of vital ship systems--and hence
late dock and sea trials. [Ref. 33:pp. 1-8, 6-11]s"
81 Although the U. S. Coast Guard COI guidelines stipulate the
absolute minimum manning requirements (with respect to fire-
fighting and lifesaving) that must be met on American-flag vessels,
a distinction must be made between COI manning levels and the
number of billets (and hence mariners) specified by government
contract. In every case, COI manning requires fewer billets to be
filled. However, General Agents and Ship Managers are required to
provide full crews in accordance with their contractual
obligations. Unfortunately, the post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm
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This is not to suggest, however, that severe shortages in
particular shipboard ratings did not exist. On the contrary, an acute shortage of
qualified mariners did (and still) exists. In fact, two categories of mariners were
in extremely short supply: radio officers (R/Os) and licensed steam engineers.
Indeed, the literature is replete with references to "skill-specific" shortages. In a
letter to ADM William J. Kime, the Commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard, Mr.
Jerome Joseph, Executive Vice President of District 2 Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association - Associated Maritime Officers (MEBA-AMO District 2)--a principal
labor union, wrote: "There is a nation-wide shortage ... of the two sea-going
ratings: radio officers and engineers, particularly, 2nd and 3rd assistants" [Ref.
36:p. 11.82
During the initial activation of the RRF, the Shipbuilders
Council of America surveyed those shipyards charged with completing the
necessary repairs. The purpose of this questionnaire was to record data on the
shipyards' abilities to perform the no-notice breakout. Of the forty-one RRF
literature revealed that serious delays were encountered in
acquiring full (contract) crews from the maritime unions. Even
Jerome Joseph, Executive Vice President of MEBA District 2, stated
in testimony before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine that "All
ships that District 2 crewed had Coast Guard minimum requirements
aboard the vessel and sailed ... short of contract levels" [Ref.
30:p. 68].
"82 Corroborated in interviews with RADM Carl J. Seiberlich, USN
(Ret.), Vice President, American President Lines, CAPT J. L. Stone,
USNR (N42), CAPT Frank X. Johnston, USNR (Ret.), Director, Maritime
Administration Western Region, and Mrs. Michelle L. Le'ý,is (N1),
Military Sealift Command.
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vessels that had been activated, the Shipbuilders Council of America received
information on nineteen RRF ships from nine shipyards. Of those, over one-third
(7 of 19) were reported as having difficulty in obtaining qualified crews. Not
surprisingly, experienced steam engineers headed the list of critically
undermanned ratings. In fact, the Council's Interim Report concluded that "the
unions ran out of crew members about the 20th of August" [Ref. 371.
But steam engineers were not the only merchant mariners in
high demand (and short supply). Additionally, there was a dearth of licensed
deck officers familiar with, or experienced in, cargo handling operations aboard
breakbulk vessels-the type of vessels that make-up the majority of the RRF.
Those who have ever served on these 'tboomships" can attest to the level of skill
required to operate the ship's cargo hatches, winches, and booms safely (and
efficiently), or negotiate the labyrinth of goosenecks, pendants, falls, slings, and
assorted ground tackle. Indeed, self-sustaining ships-like their cargo handling
apparatus--demand a modicum of extra care and experience from those who
maintain and operate them. However, then as now, "licensed deck officers for
breakbulk ships ... are not available to the [government] contractors who have the
ships under contract" [Ref. 30:p. 67].
In a statement before the House Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine on September 26, 1990, Captain Robert J. Lowen, President, International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (MM&P), testified that the Union had
great "difficulty finding qualified boomship mates to man those [breakbulk] ships"
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[Ref. 30:p. 67]. Not only were boomship deck officers "few and far between," but
the potential for personal injury (including damage to cargo and cargo handling
gear) had become exceedingly great. In the words of Captain Lowen, "there were
going to be severe casualties when unskilled mates ... handle the gear" [Ref. 30:p.
67]. This sentiment was echoed in a recent interview with CAPT Frank Johnston,
USNR (Ret.), Director, Maritime Administration Western Region: "we don't have
the qualified bosuns, or the Third Mates or Second Mates that can rig a jumbo
boom or even a regular hatch boom ... that is a great concern ..." [Ref. 38].
The task of locating U. S. mariners for the RRF ships and
other government-owned sealift assets mobilized fell to the Ship Managers,
General Agents, maritime labor unions, and MARAD. And each resorted to
"extraordinary measures" to facilitate manning of the RRF. This is not to suggest,
however, that these measures were a panacea for all manpower shortages. On
the contrary, even with measures in place "there was a ship that left ... with six
officers missing" [Ref. 30:p. 69]. But the measures implemented did do much to
alleviate the immediate symptoms of the manpower malady.
Even the shipyards readying the RRF vessels were not
immune to the shortages in qualified oceangoing labor. In at least one instance,
port engineers were "pressed into service" as assistant engineering officers when
the ship sailed because "no other officers were available" [Ref. 37]. In another
case, a shipyard reported using ex-Navy Chief Petty Officers (with steam
experience) to operate the propulsion plant. Clearly, these uncommon actions are
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indicative of industry-wide shortages. Even more disturbing, however, is the fact
that these actions were taken in response to crewing shortages which arose while
manning less than half of the RRF.81
Because the sequence, timing, and number of RRF activations
affect the magnitude and duration of the manpower-related delays (particularly
in the short term), the labor unions were compelled to commit to unorthodox
measures to satisfy the immediate demand for qualified seamen. In response to
surge manning requirements, the maritime unions solicited both physically-fit
pensioners and "inactive" mariners still possessing valid licenses and documents
early in the (sealift) crisis. These exceptional practices were confirmed by Mr.
Terry Turner, Director, Department of Congressional and Governmental Affairs,
Seafarers International Union of America, in a statement before the House
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine: "In order to meet the surge in shipping, the
union combed its records to identify potential crew members that were not ...
registered to ship with our hiring halls" [Ref. 30:p. 721.8'
83 In other instances, Ship Managers required those shipyards
to supply interim engineers to light-off and 'aintain the machinery
through completion of the dock trials. These shipyards were forced
to solicit retired engineers who were "at an age where their
ability to work long hours under adverse conditions [was] very
difficult." Refer to: Shipbuilders Council of America, Interim
Report on Participation of U. S. Shipyards in the 1990 Breakout of
Ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet.
"84 The Honorable Warren G. Leback, Maritime Administrator,
testified that "the delay in getting crewmen assigned to the RRF
ships may be due to ... an overcommittment of personnel" by the
unions. See: U. S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
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Indeed, a number of union pensioners and inactive members
were recalled to active service on RRF ships during the Persian Gulf War.
However, the definition of a "physically-fit" member was, at the same time, a
source of controversy and open to liberal union interpretation:
... I went to [Rota] to watch that transfer (between two Fast Sealift Ships ...
I was in the hospital over there, just as a courtesy walk-thru, and there was
a little old guy in a room-I thought that he was a dependent father that was
being operated on-and I went in to say hello to him ... turned out he was
a steam engineer ... he was 82 years old and had a heart attack on the way
over (to the Persian Gulf). We don't have too many of those guys left ....
[Ref. 391
In addition to employing elderly mariners while encouraging
Academy alumni associations to "canvass the troops," the maritime unions-with
MARAD concurrence-pursued manning and qualification waivers from the U.S.
Coast Guard. Although "desperate" measures such as temporary license upgrades
for those with half of the required seatime (and without a license examination)
and accelerated license exams for First Classmen at the U. S. Merchant Marine
Academy and the State Colleges were not employed, the unions did work closely
with the Coast Guard to allow those mariners on the "fringe" of the industry to
reenter during the conflict [Ref. 40: pp. 15-16]. For instance, in order to
compensate for the lack of qualified R/Os, Ship Managers received temporary
waivers from the Coast Guard. Also, deck officers lacking Radar Observer
endorsements were given extensions on that qualification. Additionally, there
Persian Gulf Sealift Reguirements, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1991,
p. 43.
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there were instances in which the Coast Guard relaxed the manning requirements
for bridge watchstanders [Ref. 40:p. 16J.'
b. Matching Skills to Ship-Type
Almost as worrisome as not having enough mariners from which
to draw on in the event of an emergency is not having enough seamen within the
various labor categories to operate the demanding cargo and propulsion systems
found on the older breakbulk ships in the RRF. Not only are most of the RRF
vessels over twenty years old, but they are equipped with cargo handling gear
and engineering systems unfamiliar to many present-day seafarers. In the words
of Robert J. Lowen, President, MM&P:
The problem is that there is a mismatch wherein the available union
resource labor does not match the contractually called-for labor, and those
contracts, of course, are with the Ready Reserve fleet. [Ref. 30:p. 67]
Not only did the unions dispatch diesel engineers with little or no
recent experience on steam plants to steam vessels, but deck officers practiced
85 Ship Managers/General Agents were allowed to substitute a
Third Mate in lieu of a Second Officer. Relaxed standards also
applied to the wages of unlicensed mariners. By late October,
1990, QMEDs and DMACs (categorized as "skilled" unlicensed
mariners) were sailing in the lower-rated capacities of FWT and
oiler--but being paid at the higher wage rate--aboard RRF vessels
to compensate for severe shortages in those unlicensed ratings.
Further, shortages of those with Lifeboatman (or other endorsement)
in MSC-controlled ships were remedied either by shipboard training
or by providing qualified mariners while the vessel was enroute.
And in at least one case, Philippine nationals were utilized to
crew an RRF ship. Refer to: U. S. Congress, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Persian Gulf Sealift Requirements, USGPO,
Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. 52, 141.
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only in container operations were ordered to serve aboard breakbulk ships with
old-fashioned booms and other relatively complex handling gear. Unfortunately,
as the number of licensed and unlicensed mariners with experience aboard older
breakbulk-type ships diminishes in response to the state of the industry, skill-
related mismatches in RRF manning are projected to escalate. [Ref. 33:pp. 1-7, 81
Under other-than-wartime circumstances, these mismatches would
not pose a significant problem for the any of the parties involved in RRF
manning. However, as demonstrated during both Phases of the sealift effort,
emergency activations afford few, if any, opportunities to conduct meaningful
watchteam training--let alone sufficient time for a proper familiarization on vital
shipboard equipment. Not only did some shipyards comment on the relatively
poor state of training of engineering crews, but also of the impact of late
assignments (and arrivals) on delayed dock and sea trials [Ref. 30:p. 130]. On-the-
job training aboard RRF ships, particularly those in five- and ten-day readiness
states, was virtually non-existent [Ref. 10:p. 54].
c. Assessment
The no-notice, weekend-initiated activation of the RRF in early
August, 1990, nearly exhausted the supply of readily available maritime labor
under the best of politico-military circumstances. Not only was there broad
international support from all corners of the globe, but ships entering the Gulf
operated in a low-threat environment-accompanied by an armada of grey-hulled
men-of-war patrolling the contiguous waters. Also, the relatively short duration
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of this conflict, and hence the sealift effort, spared the labor unions (and MARAD)
from having to locate reliefs for those serving continuously at sea. Without a
doubt, sustaining a large fleet of RRF ships on a long term basis would exacer-
bate an already acute crewing problem.
Even under these favorable conditions, the maritime unions fell
considerably short in locating the projected 9,000 mariners that would be available
for duty aboard RRF vessels. In reality, the unions barely filled the required
billets. The lessons to be gleaned from this most recent mobilization is not just
that shortages in critical seagoing ratings existed while crewing only seventy-eight
(of the then-ninety-six RRF vessels), but also that these manning shortfalls are
symptomatic of an even greater malady facing the U. S. maritime industry and
the DoD: the continued decline in the available pool of mariners. As long as
there is a national security require-Aent to maintain breakbulk-type ships in the
RRF, there will be a need to preserve a viable manpower base to crew those
vessels.
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VI. PLANNING IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SCENARIOS
Three years prior to the Persian Gulf War, the Commission on Merchant
Marine and Defense (CMMD) concluded that:
There was insufficient strategic sealift, both ships and personnel, for the
United States, using only its own resources as required by defense planning
assumptions, to execute a major contingency operation in a single distant
theater such as Southwest Asia. [Ref. 41]
Indeed, although millions of tons of military equipment and fuel were moved to
SWA, the findings of this Commission were validated by Operation Desert Shield
and Desert Storm. Without the service provided by foreign-flag carriers, the sealift
effort-and hence the timely resolution of the Persian Gulf War-would have been
in jeopardy. Arguably, the issue at hand is not whether the United States was
overly dependent on foreign-flag shipping companies to carry the cargo prior to
(and during) the conflict. That fact is not in dispute; the dearth of privately-
owned, U. S.-flag vessels compelled sealift planners to turn elsewhere for ships.
However, given this maritime reality and the post-Cold War fiscal environment,
the pertinent issue is not only whether sufficient sealift will be available, but also
whether more of the critical types of sealift platforms (i.e., RO/ROs) can be
obtained to meet the CINCs' warfighting requirements in future contingencies.
The case being made in this thesis is that regardless of politico-military cir-
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cumstances, mariner availability, rather than ship availability, will emerge as the
critical variable in future mobilizations involving U. S.-flag shipping.
A. THE FALLACY OF A "BEST CASE' SCENARIO
Nearly as perilous to national security as an overreliance on foreign-flag
carriers to move military cargo to hostile shores is the danger of relying on a 'best
case" sealift scenario as the planning foundation for future mobilizations. In
retrospect, the 1990/91 sealift response--like the geo-political conditions sur-
rounding the effort-represented a near "best case" scenario as logistics planning
gave way to execution. Unequivocally, favorable circumstances contributed to the
success of the Persian Gulf War in general, and sealift in particular. Foremost
among these factors was the inability of Iraq to counter the build-up of coalition
forces in Saudi Arabia or pose a credible threat to the Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC) anywhere in SWA. Not only did American troops marry
up with their heavy equipment in a benign--albeit tense-environment, but those
vessels carrying the combat equipment transited without incident through the
Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz [Ref. 42 :p. 153]J. Sealift
and theater planners alike must recognize the "non-role" of Iran in the allocation
of in-theater assets to protect merchant shipping. Indeed, the de facto neutrality
of Iran greatly simplified the defensive needs for the transit of coalition shipping
"'6 The fact that coalition naval and air forces exercised a
modicum of sea control (and sea denial) over Iraqi units in the
shipping lanes assured prompt delivery of cargo once in-theater.
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through the Strait of Hormuz to Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) in Saudi
Arabia.'
With virtually no serious opposition from Iraqi naval or air forces, the
United States was given "carte blanche" to execute a two-Phase sealift campaign
over a seven month period unencumbered by battle damage to vital port
facilities and with no attrition of shipping assets. Further, international politics
played a key role in the conduct and character of the sealift effort. Because the
United States-the de facto leader of the coalition-enjoyed near unanimous
intt national support from sovereign states and supranational organizations alike
for defensive (and later offensive) operations in SWA, foreign-flag ships and
crews were readily available to the U. S. government [Ref. 43:p. xi].
And finally, any discussion of favorable circumstances must include an
appreciation for the value of a modem maritime infrastructure and its impact on
the pace and conduct of this sealift effort. By having access to modem port
facilities and intermodal networks) in Saudi Arabia and neighboring states,
American-flag ships carrying equipment to SWA were able to discharge their
cargoes quickly and efficiently. Not only were there shipyards in-theater capable
of accommodating merchant and naval ships in their large graving and drydock
87 A belligerent Iran was considered among the possible
scenarios from which to design a future (2001) U. S. naval force
structure. The scenario's emphasis on a hostile Iran further
illustrates why "best case" sealift planning for future MRCs is
neither prudent nor realistic. Refer to: SECNAV POM strategy
wargame scenario, U. S. Naval War College, March, 1993.
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facilities, but most of the fuel needed to support combat operations was obtained
from sources in SWA [Ref. 29:p. 7].
But it is precisely because these auspicious circumstances/conditions may
not-and likely will not-exist when the next MRC occurs that the Desert
Shield/Desert Storm sealift model forfeits credibility as a planning tool for future
mobilizations. In any event, the evidence derived from this most recent
mobilization is obvious: although the U. S.-flag merchant fleet cannot singularly
satisfy DoD sealift requirements, vessels can be activated and/or acquired on
relatively short notice from a variety of government, commercial, and foreign-flag
sources; and more importantly, that the quantitative decline in the national pool
of maritime labor-critical to the swift and efficient activation (and operation) of
government sealift--will play an even greater role in determining the success or
failure of future mobilizations as the size of the U. S.-flag commercial fleet
continues to diminish.
MARAD employment projections, coupled with recent DoD- and MARAD-
sponsored ship acquisition and conversion initiatives, only reinforce the
hypothesis that mariner availability will emerge as the sine qua non of sealift in
the twenty-first century. If the national supply of mariners in 1990/91-then
24,000--could barely support a partial mobilization that required 2,700 available
seamen, then the maritime labor supply predicted for the turn of the century
(11,000 mariners by 2000) will be insufficient to support the projected 142-ship
RRF and inadequate to meet the demands of a "nearly simultaneous" two MRC
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scenario envisioned in the post-Desert Storm Bottom-Up Review [Ref. 44:p. 13].
Arguably, the extent of the manpower problem was masked by the geo-political
and military circumstances surrounding the build-up.'
The trend is clear: absent maritime revitalization, shortages of highly-skilled
mariners will only get worse-regardless of sealift scenario. Indeed, whether or
not foreign shipping is available to carry military cargo during an emergency is
irrelevant to the near-term RRF manning problem. That an abundance of foreign-
flag shipping would be available in any '"best case" scenario only solves part of
the sealift equation and does nothing to alleviate the causes of specialized
manning shortfalls (i.e., the lack of a healthy and robust U. S. Merchant Marine)
or address the fact that RRF vessels still must be crewed in a timely fashion.
Similarly, in a "worst case" scenario where few (if any) foreign-flag commercial
vessels are available for hire, RRF ships--and the crews needed to man them-
would perform a greater role in the mobilization. Until such time as the
composition of the RRF is changed to reflect the handling capabilities and
propulsion systems found in more modem merchant fleets, a cadre of active
mariners possessing the requisite engineering and deck-related skills must be
maintained.
88 Further, the DoD will resort to "[Slubstantial coercive
requisitioning of commercial shipping" to alleviate the shortage
of vessels during a second, concurrent MRC. Refer to: Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Mobility Recuirements Study (Volume I), January 23, 1992,
p. ES-5.
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B. MANNING OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The economics of shipping are relatively unambiguous: high union (and
shipyard) costs, strict adherence to expensive safety standards, advances in
shipboard automation, contrasted with an abundance of "cheap" maritime labor
from third world nations have taken their toll on the U. S. Merchant Marine in
general, and the maritime labor force in particular. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that the continued deterioration of the maritime industry is beyond the
control of those who exercise a modicum of control over industry-wide activities.
To the contrary, if substantive maritime reform--and increased American-flag
competitiveness--is ever to be achieved, "[all elements of] the industry can and must
do better" [Ref. 45]. In the final analysis, only a competitive and healthy maritime
industry will foster growth in the supply of seagoing manpower.
But long-term solutions are inadequate to rectify the short-term RRF
manning problems. Although prior DoD- and DoT-sponsored manpower studies
identified shortfalls, the immediacy of the manning problem was all but
confirmed during the early stages of the Desert Shield mobilization. In testimony
before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, VADM Paul Butcher, USN, then-
Deputy CINC, USTRANSCOM (and former COMSC), declared:
I don't think that you will find anyone who will say that in 1996 [emphasis
added], we will have enough mariners to do the job. [Ref. 30:p. 32]
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TABLE 6.1 MERCHANT MARINER FORECAST
Year Number of Licensed Unlicensed Total Billets'
vessels Billets Billets
1995 246 2,246 3,737 5,983
2000 1482 1,317 1,884 3,201
Source: Maritime Administration, 11 February, 1993.
' The total number of billets does not include MSC Civil Service Mariners
(CIVMARS) and reflects a "worst case" scenario for the U.S. Merchant
Marine in which there are no U.S-crewed vessels engaged in foreign trade.
2 More conservative (yet still alarming) estimates suggest that the size of
the U.S-flag merchant fleet will diminish to 200 ships by the year 2000.
This sentiment was echoed by Robert H. Moore, Director for Transportation
Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics):
... as the size of the active [U. S.-flag] fleet declines, we are concerned that
by the late 1990s we may not have enough crews with the right skills to
man reserve ships. [Ref. 3O:p. 11]
As illustrated in Table 6.1, MARAD projections for employment aboard
American-flag ships are equally bleak in the short-term. Although quantitative
and qualitative shortfalls are expected to increase as the number of billets aboard
American-flag ships decreases, there are a number of measures which, if
implemented and institutionalized, could help alleviate the shortage of qualified
seamen needed to crew RRF vessels (and other government sealift assets) on
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short- or no-notice during a mobilization. None of these measures, however,
should be considered as a panacea for the ailing maritime industry.
In the broadest context, there are two methods for closing the gap between
the quantity of RRF billets to be filled and the number of qualified mariners
available to fill those billets: on the one hand, mobilization manpower
requirements may be modified or relaxed (reducing the demand); on the other
hand, the pool of active mariners may be augmented (increasir the supply).
Clearly, the latter of the two options is the preferred and only valid method of
reducing the gap between RRF billets and mariners. In either case, however, no
single measure can hope to eliminate the long-term shortage of qualified merchant
mariners.
1. Reducing Manpower Requirements
As demonstrated in Operation Desert Shield, the greatest demand for
qualified mariners came during the early stages of the sealift mobilization when
the turmoil of RRF breakouts was at its zenith." In spite of the delays caused
by mechanical failures and late arrivals of key crew members, the good news was
that all of the vessels activated during Phase I sailed to SWA with a full
complement of seamer--albeit not all fully qualified at the time of departure. The
bad news: activating L.,S than half of the RRF depleted the entire available supply
"89 Although surge and sustainment requirements vary according
to the type, scope, and duration of the contingency, a "worst case"
scenario (a no-notice MRC, or two nearly simultaneous MRCs) is
presumed for planning purposes.
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of U. S. mariners during the early stages of the mobilization. Irrespective of the
scenario, the time for redefining and negotiating reductions in vessel manning
requirements (or enacting legislative and regulatory initiatives to that effect) is not
during the RRF activation process. On the contrary, knowing that future MRCs
may not lend themselves to extended (logistics) build-up periods, preplanned
measures can ease the RRF manning transition from "cold iron" to "underway,
shift colors."
In fact, a variety of measures designed to reduce RRF manpower
requirements (and increase the pool of available mariners) were implemented
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As discussed in Chapter V, the maritime labor
unions and MARAD petitioned the U. S. Coast Guard for temporary waivers in
at least one shipboard rating. And although the actions taken were relatively
modest in scope and severity, the concept of modifying federal regulations should
be expanded to include other measures for reducing sealift mobilization
manpower requirements. Indeed, a number of measures could be preplanned
and implemented upon activation of the RRF in the event of a national emergency,
namely:
"* Adopt a "modified COI" as the standard for manning. Rather than crewing to
contract specifications, Ship Managers/General Agents would use a tailored
COI (to include the minimum complement of stewards) as a RRF
mobilization manpower template.
"* Delete the requirement for an R/O. Although previous manpower studies had
advocated deleting the R/O billet, advances in satellite communications,
coupled with the introduction of the Global Miriime Distress and Safety
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System (GMDSS), have made it possible--and practical-for licensed deck
officers to assume most of the duties of a qualified R/O in an emergency.
"Repeal the Crossover Law. The United States is one of only two countries
which prohibits cross utilization of seamen in the Deck and Engine
departments. By repealing this Law, off-watch personnel and non-
watchstanders would be available to perform preventive and corrective
maintenance under the authority of an inter-departmental maintenance
"shop." Not only would the elimination of "crossover" restrictions benefit
materiel readiness, but by overturning the traditional organizational
paradigm, this measure would prevent redundancies in crewing and reduce
the total number of billets.°
" Eliminate the three-watch requirement. Title 46 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) requires a master to maintain "at least three watches" at
sea.91 Again, by repealing this requirement, reductions in mobilization
shortages can be achieved. Further, those mariners who would have been
needed formerly for RRF vessel X would be available to crew RRF ships Y
and Z.
" Allow a one man bridge watch during open ocean transit. With the exception of
heavy traffic conditions and durIng periods of restricted maneuvering (and
visibility), a single licensed watchstander can assume the functions of a
lookout and a helmsman (normally an AB). If needed, watchstanders can be
summoned quickly to the bridge by a phone call or general
announcement. 92
Although distasteful to those committed to maritime revitalization,
these measures would assist in crewing a larger RRF with fewer (projected)
seamen. This list is not exhaustive; there are other proven measures for resolving
mobilization shortages. For example, some foreign-flag vessels operate without
90 The Crossover Law (46 USC 8104(e)) stipulates that no
mariner may serve in both Deck and Engine departments.
91 46 U.S.C. 8104.
92 In fact, during open-sea conditions, helm control aboard
merchant vessels is relegated to the "Iron Mike" (the autopilot).
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manned enginerooms. The concept of an unattended engineroom is neither
unique nor new: shipboard automation-once considered to be "the wave of the
future"-is here to stay. Indeed, remote monitoring of vital systems has made it
possible to reduce seagoing billets. But despite its merits, this measure is
technology-dependent. Although ideally suited for diesel-powered ships,
automated enginerooms on older, steam-driven vessels is, at the same time,
impractical and dangerous. As long as the majority of ships in the RRF is steam-
powered, a supply of experienced mariners will be required to man the
engineering spaces on those vessels.93
2. Increasing the Labor Supply
Independent of, and in addition to, reducing the number of
mobilization billets on RRF ships (and other government-owned vessels), the gap
between seafarers and billets can be closed by increasing the national pool of
mariners available to fill those billets. Ideally, a healthy U. S. Merchant Marine
would provide the employment base--irrespective of seafarer to billet ratios-from
which an abundance of qualified seamen could be obtained on short-notice.
However, the reverse is equally valid: as the size of the U. S.-flag Merchant
Marine plummets in response to market dynamics, the supply of mariners from
which to rely on decreases. The influence of a commercially-viable U. S.
91 For a comprehensive analysis of shipping company and union-
sponsored initiatives, refer to: Presearch Incorporated, CrewinQ
the Merchant Marine for Mobilization, Report No. MA-RD-840-90013,
Arlington, Virginia, January, 1991, pp. V-12 through V-18.
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Merchant Marine on the pool of readily available mariners cannot be
overemphasized. In the words of Mr. Louis M. Lambremont, a senior executive
with Sea-Land Service, Inc., during a recent interview:
Unless we're there (U. S.-flag carriers) to provide year-round employment
to the merchant mariners, [then] you are going to lose that resource ... and
be it now or in the year 2005, when you do have an emergency and you
have to activate vessels, you may not have the manpower to do it. [Ref. 461
Aside from maritime reform and revitalization, there are a number of
measures which, if implemented, will increase the national supply of "surge"
manpower. And like those which focused on reducing mobilization requirements,
some supply-side measures were instituted during the Gulf War. For instance,
not only did the U. S. Coast Guard relax manning requirements and grant exten-
sions and waivers for particular endorsements-in essence modifying regulatory
provisions to increase the supply of mariners, but indirect methods including
wage compensation encouraged "skilled" unlicensed seamen to "sign-on articles"
as lower-rated members in (engineering) departments aboard RRF ships.
In any event, these ad hoc measures can be expanded and
institutionalized to cover a variety of billets and qualifications. Not only are these
supply-side measures at once bureaucratically-feasible, fiscally-realistic, and
functional, but the adoption of such measures could serve as the framework for
a federal "List of Manning Exceptions" to be implemented during a national
emergency or wartime. Additionally, programmatic initiatives sponsored by DoD
and DoT warrant reconsideration and more importantly, budgetary support.
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a. Thke U. S. Maritime Service Reserve
The legislative authority to (re)establish a U. S. Maritime Service
(USMS) to train officers and unlicensed mariners aboard American-flag merchant
vessels is provided by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended." The
rationale for creating a MARAD-administered USMS Reserve is straightforward-
the dearth of qualified seamen to man sealift vessels. The principal objective of
the proposed Reserve program is equally direct: to establish a civilian merchant
marine manpower pool capable of augmenting the (active) seagoing workforce
in a crisis. This cadre of qualified mariners would be available to MARAD for
immediate call-up in an emergency to crew the RRF and other government-
controlled sealift assets.
Although a variety of high- and low-cost options have been
proposed, the underlying philosophy of this USMS Reserve program is to recruit
licensed and unlicensed mariners currently employed ashore. Because the
program targets both licensed and unlicensed seamen, MARAD would be able to
choose from among a number of manpower sources. Of the potential sources,
two hold the most promise for inclusion into the USMS Reserve: seafarers who
leave the active workforce; and those who complete one of the training programs
but are unable to secure employment on U. S.-flag merchant vessels. In any
event, the intent of the program is to man only that portion of the RRF which
94 46 U.S.C. 1295 (e).
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cannot be crewed through commercial methods (union hiring). Although USMS
Reserve personnel would be used to cover any manning shortages, those seamen
actively sailing in the U. S. Merchant Marine would remain the primary source
of labor during contingency RRF mobilization." [Ref. 271
b. USNR-Manning of the RRF
The DoD is considering a program similar in scope and purpose
to a MARAD-sponsored U. S. Maritime Service Reserve. Rather than relying on
civilian mariners, U. S. Naval Reservists would crew only those RRF vessels which
cannot be manned through commercial means [Ref. 35].% As with any initiative,
the final objective of this proposal is the quick and efficient activation of the RRF
in wartime. To that end, "hybrid" naval reserve crews would be used to activate
(and man) the least commercially viable ships in the RRF on short notice.97 But
unlike the USMS Reserve initiative, RRF vessels crewed by USNR personnel
"95 Recent estimates have scored this proposal at $11 million
per year for a 2,000-member USMS Reserve program. Despite
criticisms over training effectiveness, low-end costing, the
ability to deploy quickly, and concerns regarding the involuntary
recall of civilians during wartime or national crisis, a USMS
Reserve not only provides a readily available pool of qualified
mariners in the event of mobilization, but offers an opportunity
for those not sailing actively to continue their affiliation with
the U. S. Merchant Marine (while preserving their "perishable"
skills).
If Annual cost for a 2,000-member U. S. Naval Reserve program
(crews and training included) has been estimated at $20 million.
"97 In its present form, this program proposes USNR-manning of
the RRF on a crew by crew (not billet by billet) basis. The
justification for this methodology is clear: it is at once
impractical and illegal to hold civilian and military personnel on
the same ship to the same standards of conduct and discipline.
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would no longer enjoy the status of "innocent" merchantmen in a maritime court
or a war zone; on the contrary, unlike their civilian counterparts, RRF ships
manned by USNR personnel (on active duty) would assume the legal status of
"U. S. Naval Ships"-with all the rights and obligations accorded to men-of-war."
[Ref. 35]
The composition and structure of this USNR-manning program
warrant re,.4;w. As proposed, this program would rely heavily on the Merchant
Marine Reserve, U. S. Naval Reserve (MMR-USNR) program as a source of skilled
manpower.' Although the intent of this MMR-USNR program is to ensure that
merchant marine officers are indoctrinated in naval tactics and communications
procedures, licensed deck, engineer, and radio officers affiliated with the MMR-
USNR program but who are no longer sailing actively would be recruited to form
nucleus RRF crews.1 "
98 Strictly interpreted, merchant vessels manned by active duty
naval personnel surrender their status as unarmed merchantmen. In
effect, these ships would be considered as combatants. As such,
they are subject to the same rules of engagement (ROE) afforded to
belligerents.
99 The primary source of MMR-USNR officers is the U. S.
Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. Mariners who receive
commissions in the MMR-USNR, including merchant marine officers
(actively) sailing and those licensed but employed ashore in the
U. S. maritime industry, compose the Merchant Marine Individual
Ready Reserve Group (MMIRRG).
"100 Those MMR-USNR officers actively sailing in the U. S.
Merchant Marine would continue to crew merchant ships during
mobilization. The criteria for success of USNR-manning is "to
equal or exceed (the] capabilities of [a] commercial crew hastily
formed from [the] union hall." See: CAPT Frank Flyntz, "Crewing
the RRF: Status Report, " briefing for VADM Loftus, USN, (N4), on 30
119
In fact, a three-tier approach to officer manning is envisioned in
this USNR program. In addition to petitioning MMIRRGs who are no longer
employed by U. S.-flag carriers, Naval Reserve officers possessing a valid license-
as well as reservists holding a surface warfare designator-would be likely
candidates for inclusion. Indeed, there are many potential benefits from USNR-
manning of RRF vessels: not only would reservists be formed into crews and
assigned to particular RRF ships, but each participant would receive equipment-
specific training; further, involuntary call-up (and the employment rights which
accompany military duty during an emergency) are part and parcel of a reserve
commitment; and finally, latitude is given to "public vessel" manning vis a vis COI
guidelines.
Unfortunately, this USNR-manning program is biased towards
licensed billets aboard RRF ships. By definition, the MMIRRG is a source of
reserve officers; there is no enlisted equivalent in the Merchant Marine. Until such
time as the MMR-USNR is expanded to include enlisted ratings/unlicensed
seamen, advocates of USNR-manning are in the unenviable position of having to
"attract" enlisted personnel from non-merchant marine-related surface reserve
units to fill unlicensed billets aboard RRF ships."'0
August 1993.
101 Approximately twenty-six (of the thirty-six) billets per
RRF ship would be manned by unlicensed/enlisted personnel.
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c. Other Manning Opportunities
In addition to the aforementioned manning programs and billet-
reduction initiatives, there are other RRF manning opportunities which, if
exploited, also would increase the maritime manpower supply available during
sealift mobilization. Among the more promising of RRF-manning opportunities
include:
" Conversion of "non-deep-sea" maritime labor. Data from previous manpower
studies not only indicate that "thousands" of seamen employed in the non-
deep-sea maritime industry are available for sealift-manning, but confirm
that their nautical skills closely resemble those needed by their deep-sea
counterparts.
" Relaxing/waiving federal regulations. Modifying USCG licensing requirements
in order to increase the supply of seamen is a proven (and relatively safe)
technique. Not only were minimum seatime requirements reduced by half
during the Vietnam War, but MARAD accelerated the graduation dates of
the USMMA in 1966 and 1967 to meet the demand for licensed mariners.
" Active-duty manning. Although considered a politically sensitive measure
(and one that would require executive and/or legislative support), active
duty Navy personnel could assist in the rapid and efficient activation (and
if necessary, the subsequent operation) of RRF vessels. Because there is a
wealth of knowledge--particularly in steam engineering-within the Navy
community, personnel possessing those perishable engineering skills would
be invaluable as operators and/or "sea partners" to civilian mariners until
available or adequately "refreshed."
" Recruiting of former military personnel. Another variation of the same
(military) theme: a plethora of Navy, Coast Guard, Army Corps of Engineers
(and NOAA) personnel could fill both licensed and unlicensed billets in RRF
ships with the minimum of training.
" Augmenting RRF crews with CIVMAR personnel. Because a number of MSC-
owned ships do not have a wartime mission per se (nor are they outfitted to
load/offload cargo), at least some of the mariners who would be assigned
to those particular ships could be made available to man RRF ships during
the early stages of a sealift mobilization.
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" Providing MARAD with the authority to crew RRF vessels. Currently, no
legislative mechanism exists to "draft" mariners in wartime or to provide the
government with the authority to crew "priority" vessels during a
mobilization. Either-or both-of these measures would facilitate the prompt
crew Ing of RRF vessels.
" Capturing "leavers." Arguably, the most salient of the opportunities is the
need to attract those active duty sailors and merchant seamen with deck,
engineering, and radio/communications skills who have left the sea into an
affiliation with either a MARAD- or DoN-administered reserve program.
" Expanding the MMR-USNR program. Serious consideration should be given
to augmenting this program to include enlisted ratings/unlicensed
personnel. Make the MMR-USNR program an "attractive" career option for
those seeking a commitment in the Naval Reserve.
Again, two key points merit reiteration: first, like their demand-side
counterparts, these measures can be institutionalized to facilitate the activation of
the RRF in future contingencies. Although no single measure can hope to
eliminate the gap between billets and mariners, the adoption of any one measure
(or preferably a combination of measures) would ease the RRF manning shortage.
Secondly, and more importantly, none of these measures are a panacea for the
ailing U. S. Merchant Marine. Without substantive reform, the maritime labor
supply will continue to fall precipitously. Nevertheless, the time to implement
these measures is now--before the RRF manning problem surfaces again during
the next MRC or extended crisis.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Historically, U. S.-flag merchant vessels have carried over ninety-five percent
of all military cargo during wartime. Today, that same U. S. Merchanit Marine-
indispensable to a global strategy based on credible forward presence and to the
economic security of the nation-is on the verge of extinction. Often described as
America's "forth arm of defense," the decline of the U. S.-flag Merchant Marine
vis a vis other maritime states must not be viewed solely as an economic issue
devoid of military importance. On the contrary, as demonstrated again in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the lack of a healthy and robust U. S.
Merchant Marine (and maritime infrastructure) will impact adversely on the
ability of the U. S. Department of Defense to carry vital equipment and supplies
to distant theaters in support of national (and multinational) objectives.
Despite the accolades during and since the Persian Gulf War, the sealift
response was, at best, a qualified success. Although millions of tons of cargo and
fuel were carried to SWA, the issue of whether sufficient sealift is-or will be--
available on short-notice in an emergency warrants reconsideration. Even as late
as January, 1991, manpower estimates for the latter part of the decade were
overly optimistic. One MARAD-sponsored study concluded that "shortages do
not exist for surge scenarios in ... 1995, but [shortages] do exist for sustained sealift
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scenarios" [Ref. 27 :p. XI-23]." As the Desert Shield mobilization demonstrated,
this evaluation was premature and incorrect; surge manpower shortages occurred
nearly a decade earlier than anticipated. The trend is clear and the evidence
compelling: mariner availability, not ship availability, will emerge as the critical
variable in the sealift equation.
As with previous sealift mobilizations, the sine qua non of logistics during the
Persian Gulf War was the capability to carry maximum payload to the SWA
theater as quickly as possible. However, one is cautioned against making
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the policy model for sealift operations
in the post-Cold War environment. Although particular aspects of the sealift
response during the Persian Gulf War parallel the Vietnam sealift effort, and are
instructive as planning tools for future regional conflicts, placing too much
emphasis on the conduct or characteristics of this recent MRC does as much to
misrepresent the status of the American Merchant Marine as to disregard the geo-
political and military conditions in August, 1990. Not only was the United States
given "carte blanche" to execute a two-phase sealift campaign over a seven month
period, unencumbered by battle damage to vital port facilities in SWA and
without attrition of commercial shipping, but an abundance of foreign-flag vessels
was available to carry the lion's share portion of surge and sustainment cargo to
SWA.
102 This same study concluded that surge phase shortages in
maritime labor would occur by the year 2000.
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It is precisely because these (and other auspicious circumstances) may not
exist when the next regional contingency occurs that the Desert Shield/Desert
Storm sealift model forfeits credibility as a framework upon which to chart future
mobilizations of the RRF. Notwithstanding the unique geo-political climate
caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, sufficient commercial shipping-American
and foreign-flag-was (and could be) available to carry DoD equipment.
Although sufficient U. S.-flag sustainment lift was achieved, American shipping
companies (and the RRF) were unable to satisfy surge requirements. Indeed, this
was a global effort, both in terms of distance from CONUS to SWA and the many
nations from which sealift was acquired.
Additionally, a number of measures could have been taken to increase the
supply of U. S.-flag (and U. S.-controlled) shipping particularly in the early stages
of the mobilization. In fact, a conscious decision was made by the leadership in
the Pentagon and MARAD not to include certain categories of shipping assets in
the sealift call-up. Sealift planners worked under self-imposed constraints
regarding the utilization of commercial vessels in order to preserve market share
status quo for U. S. carriers. Clearly, the abundance of foreign-flag vessels was a
key factor in the decision not to disrupt commercial shipping interests. If
required to support logistics operations, vessels participating in the SRP and VTA
as well as militarily-useful EUSC vessels could have been pressed into
government service. However, none of these measures were implemented. Nor
was any political decision made to request assets from NATO or to pursue other
125
politically-expedient avenues for foreign-flag shipping. The case being made here
is that it might be feasible to obtain sufficient U. S.- and foreign-flag sealift to
satisfy the logistics demands of future conflicts.
But the term "sufficient sealift" goes beyond the parochial definition of sealift
as ships. Sufficient sealift requires more than merely possessing or having access
to enough vessels to move military cargo in time of war; maritime labor also is
needed as a precondition for effective mobilization. Unfortunately, the pool of
qualified, actively sailing mariners continues to fall precipitously in response to
the decrease in the size of the U. S.-flag Merchant Marine. MARAD employment
projections only reinforce the hypothesis that mariner availability-more
specifically, the lack of qualified U. S. merchant mariners-will emerge as the critical
variable in future mobilizations. The fact that the labor supply was sufficient to
crew MPS, APS, FSS, MSC-owned and American-flag commercial ships in the
latter half of 1990 does not diminish the seriousness and immediacy of the nation-
wide manning problem. On the contrary, if the national pool of actively sailing
mariners-then 24,000-was all but exhausted in a geo-political '"best case" scenario
which required neither reliefs for those sailing nor the crewing of the balance of
RRF vessels (not to mention the participation of SRP, VTA, and EUSC ships), then
the projected maritime labor supply of 11,000 mariners by the year 2000 clearly
will be insufficient to crew the 142-vessel RRF and inadequate to meet the needs
of a "nearly simultaneous" two MRC scenario as envisioned in the post-Desert
Storm Bottom-Up Review.
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Indeed, the immediate requirement for sealift, coupled with the no-notice
activation of the RRF, exceeded the capabilities of the maritime labor unions to
provide qualified crews at contract levels. According to pre-Desert Storm
manpower estimates, a pool of 9,000 actively sailing mariners would be available
to crew the RRF in an emergency. However, this figure was not realized; even
under the most favorable circumstances, the maritime unions fell considerably
short in locating active seamen to fill the required billets on RRF ships.
Moreover, "extraordinary measures" were taken just to obtain the 2,700 mariners
needed to crew eighty percent of the Ready Reserve Force. (In fact, these ad hoc
measures were implemented in response to manpower shortfalls which arose
while crewing less than half of the ships in the RRF inventory during Phase I of
the mobilization).
In addition to quantitative shortages, qualitative shortages were experienced
during the no-notice activation of the RRF. Not only did the maritime labor
unions dispatch diesel engineers with little (or no) recent experience on steam
plants to steam-powered ships, but deck officers practiced only in container
handling operations were ordered to older breakbulk ships with old-fashioned
booms and complex arrays of handling gear. Unfortunately, as the number of
licensed and unlicensed seamen experienced in breakbulk operations diminishes
in response to the (depressed) state of the U. S. Merchant Marine, skill-related
mismatches in RRF assignment are expected to multiply.
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The foremost lesson to be relearned is that there is no substitute for a
dependable, American-flag fleet-in-being to provide the merchant ships and
mariners needed in an emergency. However, absent maritime revitalization,
neither the ships nor the skilled mariners will be available to support logistics
operations in SWA or any other theater. The fact that an abundance of foreign-
flag vessels may be available in any 'best case" scenario does nothing to alleviate
the causes of the personnel shortages or address the requirement to crew the RRF
expeditiously. Even in a near "worst case" scenario, where few foreign-flag ships
are available to move military cargo, the RRF-and the seamen needed to man
them--would play a greater role in the logistics effort. In the final analysis, as
long as there is a national security requirement to maintain an RRF-let alone an
RRF that is composed primarily of older breakbulk-type vessels, there will be
need to preserve a manpower base to crew those sealift assets.
It is at once ironic and incomprehensible that the National Performance
Review should recommend reducing support for maritime training programs at
a time when the nation-wide pool of actively sailing mariners cannot support the
wholesale activation of ships in the RRF. Although frequently among the last to
receive formal recognition (and funding), strategic sealift is an enabling capability
that cannot be reconstituted easily or quickly to suit the logistics needs of the
moment. This study has highlighted a number of measures which, if
implemented, would reduce the disparity between RRF billets and (available)
mariners. Ideally, a healthy U. S. Merchant Marine would provide sufficient
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numbers of seamen. But if recent history can be used as prologue to the next
decade and beyond, sweeping reform will not be forthcoming. Faced with this
reality and the need to maintain a cadre of qualified seamen to crew government
vessels, mobilization manning requirements can be relaxed (reducing the demand
for seamen) and the manpower pool can be expanded (increasing the supply of
mariners).
Although no single measure or programmatic initiative will eliminate the
gap between billets and mariners, the majority are bureaucratically-feasible and
fiscally-responsible. These measures are not without historical precedent; some
were implemented successfully during the Vietnam War. The challenge, then, is
to expand and institutionalize these formerly ad hoc measures to include a variety
of merchant mariner qualifications. In doing so, serious consideration should be
given to establishing not only a crisis-oriented federal "List of Manning
Exceptions," but also a dual program for RRF manning. A MARAD-sponsored
Merchant Marine Reserve and a Navy-administered manning program-
complementary in scope and mission-if enacted, could provide and train enough
mariners to crew government vessels on short-notice.
In any case, the evidence derived from the Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm mobilization is straightforward: although the U. S.-flag Merchant Marine
cannot singularly meet DoD sealift requirements, under favorable circumstances
vessels can be activated and/or acquired from a variety of government,
commercial, and foreign-flag sources; and more importantly, that the quantitative
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and qualitative decline in the supply of available maritime manpower will assume
an even greater role in the success or failure of future regional conflicts. It is time
to chart the course by setting priorities. We cannot afford to do less.
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